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 Quantitative studies have focused on economics, social structures, and lack of political  
 
freedoms as being elemental factors for civil war onset.  However, these studies have neglected  
 
the possibility of a civil war being an unintended consequence of international military  
 
intervention.  I conduct an empirical analysis of the association between military intervention  
 
and civil war onset by collecting data for twenty countries within the Middle East/North African  
 
regions from 1980 to 2000.  Using the International Military Intervention data set, I categorized  
 
“international intervention” into nine different types, all of which were regressed with intrastate  
 
war data derived from the Correlates of War project.  Two logit regression analyses were used to  
 
obtain the results, one of which analyzes civil war at time t and the independent variables at t-1.   
 
Additionally, marginal effects were computed to reflect accurate estimates.  Overall, the data  
 
revealed that certain types of interventions are conducive to civil war onset, such as those  
 
pursuing terrorists or rebel groups across the border, gaining or retaining territory, and  
 
humanitarian interventions.   Other types of interventions, such as those for social protection  
 
purposes, taking sides in a domestic dispute, and for the purpose of affecting policies of the  
 
target country, has a negative association with civil war onset.  Two case studies, the 1953 U.S.  
 
intervention into Iran and the 1979 Soviet Union intervention into Afghanistan, reflects the  
 
observed findings of the two regression models.  
 






dramatically since the end of World War II; therefore, it is important to have a better  
 
understanding of the association between the two events.  To my knowledge, this is the first  
 
study that has categorized different types of interventions under which results indicate that the  
 
purpose of a military intervention does effect the likelihood of civil war onset.  Scholars may  
 
develop this study further with the goal of establishing a better understanding of both phenomena  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since the end of World War II, intrastate war has been the dominant form of conflict  
 
while becoming more serious both in intensity and duration than interstate wars.  In fact, among  
 
the 225 general conflicts that occurred in the world from 1946 to 2001, 163 of the conflicts have  
 
been identified as internal conflicts.
1
  Perhaps what is more alarming is that ninety-five of these  
 
internal conflicts have occurred in the short period between 1989 and 2001.
2
  The figure below  
 




The consequences of intrastate conflict are often devastating, resulting in displaced  
 
citizens, economic turmoil, regional instability, and often result in the creation of havens that  
 
breed terrorists.  Because of the severity and robust increase in intrastate conflict, scholars are  
 
finding it increasingly important to understand the causes of these conflicts, in addition to  
 
conditions existing in a particular state that make it more prone to civil war.  
 
One condition in particular is whether the state experiencing the intrastate war was victim  
 
of a foreign intervention prior to the civil war breaking out.  International military intervention is  
 
nothing new.  In fact, it has been occurring for centuries and has consequently created the world  
 
order as it is today.   
                                                 
1










Figure 1. The Number of State-Based Armed Conflict by Type, 1946-2007 





















However, the advents of global mobility and aeronautical technology have made  
 
international military intervention become easier, quicker, and much more intense now than it  
 
was a century ago.   
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between international military  
 
intervention and civil war onset, generally, and whether the purpose of the intervention makes a  
 
difference as to whether or not civil war is likely to ensue, specifically.  It must be noted that  
 
discussing foreign intervention as a result of civil war exceeds the scope of this thesis.  Rather, I  
 
am analyzing the link between a foreign military intervention occurring, and civil war onset  
 
resulting. Several scholars have suggested that specific conditions existing within a state make  
 
civil war more likely to occur.  This thesis analyzes whether or not foreign military intervention  
 
is a condition that precipitates civil war.   
 
Because modern resources have made it relatively easy for one state to intervene into  
 
another, governments often have a variety of reasons as to why it is intervening into a sovereign  
 
state. I examine nine different purposes of intervention: social protection for citizens in the state  
 
being intervened, pursuing rebel or terrorists forces across the border, protecting economic  
 
interests, intervention for humanitarian purposes, intervention for acquisition or retention of  
 
territory, intervening for strategic purposes in terms of pursuing ideological goals, protecting  
 
military and/or diplomatic interests of the intervener, taking sides in a domestic dispute, and  
 






When intervening, states have the option to do so unilaterally or multilaterally, in  
 
addition to taking a military or non-military approach.  Only unilateral military interventions are  
 
of interest in this work.  As we see in chapter five, the purpose of the intervention does effect  
 




 The research questions this thesis seeks to answer are twofold: foreign military  
 
intervention does facilitate civil war onset.  However, the type of foreign military intervention  
 
strongly effects whether or not civil war onset will occur. To answer these questions, I gathered  
 
data on intrastate wars that have occurred in 20 countries located in the Middle Eastern /  
 
North African regions during a twenty-year period, (from 1980 to 2000).    
 
I also collected data on international military interventions that have occurred within  
 
those countries and the same time period.  Because a foreign intervention can have long-term  
 
effects on the intervened country, it is a basic assumption in this thesis that if a civil war  
 
occurred within one year following an intervention, there is an association between the two  
 




 Although there has been ample work done on the causes of civil war, there has been no  
 






abundance of literature regarding foreign military intervention in general, but the focus of those  
 
findings are typically restricted to either third-party interventions in civil wars or justifications of  
 
doing such without any regard to its effect on causing civil war.   
 
Furthermore, there is little literature that categorizes the purposes of interventions; rather,  
 
“intervention” is considered to be all-encompassing. Generalizing “intervention” can be  
 
potentially misleading because the term itself means „intrusion‟ or „interference‟ and implies acts  
 
that encourage war. 
3
  However, there are purposes of intervention whereby the motivation for  
 
direct interference is benign, such as humanitarian or social protection interventions.   
 
Although mere imperialism or colonialism may have been the main driving motivation in  
 
the past, modern advances in technology and simplicity have given government leaders  
 
expansive purposes to intervene into another country.  Therefore, it is highly statistically useful  
 
to disaggregate the different types of intervention purposes so that government leaders are better  
 
able to predict what the potential consequences of intervening into a country will be, notably  
 
civil war.   
 
 Of the nine categories of purposes of intervention explored in this thesis, the data reveal  
 
that civil war onset is positively associated with interventions for the purpose of  
 
pursuing a terrorists or rebel across the target country‟s border, humanitarian interventions,  
 
acquiring or retaining territory, and protecting military property, diplomatic, and economic  
                                                 
3
 Herbert K. Tillema, “Foreign Overt Military Intervention in the Nuclear Age,” Journal of Peace Research 26, no. 2 








 By contrast, interventions for purpose of affecting social policies of the target country,  
 
taking sides in a domestic dispute, social protection, and strategic inventions with the purpose of  
 
advancing ideological goals all have a negative association with civil war onset.  These results  
 
invite questions as to why this pattern exists, and whether there are other factors that make a  
 




 Following this chapter is the literature review, which indicates two strands of scholarship:  
 
civil war and foreign military intervention.  The former addresses the causes of civil war and  
 
conditions that are conducive to civil war onset.  The latter strand of scholarship discusses the  
 
nine purposes of intervention in detail.  The third chapter discusses the overall theoretical  
 
intuition, which involves three theories that attempt to explain why civil war occurs.  Also,  
 




  Arguably since international security and power considerations are critical factors that  
 
shape the foreign policy behavior of states.   
  
 The fourth chapter discusses the methodology of this study, which include the  
 
justification for selecting the Middle Eastern/North African regions for the years 1980 and 2000.   
 
I will also explain the advantages and disadvantages of conducting a pooled cross-sectional time  
                                                 
4






series, in addition to discussing the data sources, variables, and hypotheses.  The fifth chapter  
 
will explain the results of the two regression models, which will determine whether any  
 
hypotheses were correct.  Chapter five will also include the limitations in this study as well as  
 
areas for future research.  
 
The sixth chapter introduces two case studies: the 1953 United States led  
 
intervention into Iran (codenamed “Operation AJAX”) and the 1979 Soviet Union intervention  
 
into Afghanistan.  The U.S. and the Soviet Union intervened in countries in the same region for  
 
the purpose of both strategy and choosing sides in a domestic dispute, yet civil war broke out in  
 
Afghanistan, but not in Iran.  The data results are consistent with the two case studies, which is  
 
elaborated on in chapter six.   
  
 The seventh chapter will conclude with a brief summary of the overall thesis.  There are  
 
three appendices: appendix A lists all of the interventions, categorized by type, that were used in  
 
this study, in addition to a brief description of each.  Appendix B lists the civil wars that were  
 
analyzed in this study, and also gives a brief description of each.  Finally, appendix C provides  
 
the exact year that data were collected for Alesina‟s fractionalization data set, discussed in detail  
 





CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE 
 
 The literature review will begin by explaining how civil war is measured in this thesis.   
 
Scholars often offer their own operationalization of civil war as there is no standard operational  
 
definition to follow; therefore, it is imperative to discuss whose measurement of civil war that I  
 
will be using.  Additionally, I will make the distinction between “civil war” and “armed  
 
conflict,” as the terms are often mistakenly used interchangeably despite having entirely different  
 
meanings and criteria.     
 
 This chapter then divides into two strands of scholarship: the first pertinent only to civil  
 
war and the second discussing the work done on foreign military interventions.  I will begin the  
 
discussion of the civil war strand by briefly examining the motivations and feasibility of  
 
engaging in civil war on an individualistic level.  I will also introduce competing arguments  
 
explaining why individuals rebel and incentives they may have in doing so.   
 
Still within the civil war strand, I will then present several arguments offered by scholars  
 
on the causes of civil war such as ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity within a state, the  
 
economic status of the state, regime type, extent of political freedoms, and the effect that natural  
 
resources have on instigating civil war.  Additionally, some scholars argue that conditions such  
 
as terrain, population size, and whether the country was previously colonized are also conducive  
 
to civil war onset; therefore, those arguments will also be discussed.   
 





purposes of intervention.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, neither the consequences nor  
 
effects that foreign military intervention have on civil wars themselves will be discussed.   
 
Instead, I adhere only to the actual purpose or motivation of the intervention itself.  Long-term  
 
consequences of foreign intervention will also be explored, as many have been shown to alter the  
 
conditions within the intervening state, which could facilitate or contribute to the likelihood of  
 
civil war onset.    
 
Measuring Civil War 
 
 To understand civil war, we must first be able to describe it, and this may be particularly  
 
true of war given that it consistently changes over time.  In the empirical literature, there has  
 
been incredible growth in studies due to the compilation of quantitative data sets; yet, there is no  
 
consensus as to how civil war should be measured.
5
  Since I use the Correlates of War (COW)  
 




Prior to 1994, the COW project defined a “civil war” as any armed conflict that involved:  
 
(1) military action internal to the metropole; (2) a total of at least 1,000 battle-deaths  
 
during each year of the war;  (3) the active participation of the national government; and, (4)  
 
                                                 
5
 Nicholas Sambanis, “What is civil War?  Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition.” 





effective resistance by both sides.
6
 The metropole refers to areas integrated under the central  
 




  To be considered a civil war, the military action had to occur within the boundaries  
 
of the metropole.   
 
A territory was regarded as part of the metropole if there were no constitutional  
 
provisions denying the subjects the right to participate in the government.  The federal district  
 






In 1994, the COW Project began slightly modifying and updating its war typology and  
 
coding rules.  The reasoning for these changes included the desire to: expand the war typology to  
 
include additional types of armed conflict, modify the metropole distinction, change the coding  
 
of some of the variables to make them more comparable to all of the war types, and, to alter  
 
some of the coding practices that had been perceived as “Eurocentric.”
9
  Also, there were a  
 
number of growing armed conflicts that did not fit comfortably within the existing COW  
 
categories; therefore, the COW project refined its criteria of what is now referred to as “intrastate  
 
war,” as opposed to the formerly used “civil war.”  
                                                 
6
 Meredith Reid Sarkees, et al., “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their 
Disribution over Time, 1816-1997.” International Studies Quarterly  47, no. 1 (2003), 57.   
7
 Ibid., 58.   
8
 M. Small and J.D. Singer (1982). Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816-1980.  Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
9





More broadly, Small and Singer changed the criteria of being a legitimate member of the  
 
international community.  Historically, a state had to have a population of 500,000, it had to be  
 
sovereign, and it had to be recognized as such by the United Nations.
10
  However, the criteria has  
 
been changed to only reflect the necessary recognition by the international community, most  
 




Currently, “intrastate war” is based on the following main characteristics: (1) mutual  
 
military action was involved; (2) there must be at least 1,000 battle deaths during the course of  
 
the civil war; (3) the national government at the time was actively involved; and, (4) there must  
 
be effective resistance, which is measured by the ratio of the weaker to the strong forces that  
 
occurred on both sides.
12
   
 
 With regard to the first criterion, the primary change in the new typology was removing  
 
the distinction between the metropole and the periphery within intrastate war.
13
  Thus, all  
 
military action resulting in war that takes place within the recognized territory of a state will  
 
automatically fall under the intrastate war category; whereas, a non-state entity outside its border  
 
will be considered an extra-systemic war.   
 
Additionally, the requirement of mutual military action is instrumental in distinguishing  
 
                                                 
10
 Small and Singer, 211-12.  
11
 Sarkees, et al., “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars,” 59. 
12
 Meredith Sarkees and Phil Schafer, “The Correlates of War Data on War: an Update to 1997,”  Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 18, no. 1 (2000), 126.  
13





intrastate war from one-sided violence, such as massacres.
14
 Thus, incidents that involved large- 
 
scale massacres of disarmed combatants or prisoners outside of combat operations will not be  
 
considered mutual military action.  Consequently, condition one will not be met.
15
  Also, “hide- 
 
and-seek” operations that do not involve any combat over an extended period of time but  
 




With regard to the second criterion, Small and Singer modified the type of member to be  
 
considered in the 1,000 battle death threshold.  Before discussing this modification, it must first  
 
be noted that authors frequently use the terms deaths and casualties interchangeably, despite the  
 
different meanings whereby the latter includes both those who died and the number wounded.   
 
Keep in mind, the COW Project includes only the number of deaths to meet the 1,000 threshold;  
 




Prior to 1994, Small and Singer included civilian deaths in this 1,000 battle-death figure  
 
because it was difficult to distinguish the combatants from the civilian population.
18
  However,  
 
including the non-state-participant deaths in the total number of deaths to meet the 1,000  
 
threshold had significantly increased the number extra-state wars, and was not properly  
 
categorizing the intrastate from the extra-state wars.
19
  Therefore, the current requirement for  
                                                 
14
 Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Codebook for the COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 
of the Data),” 13. Correlates of War homepage, www.correlatesofwar.org (accessed December 4, 2014). 
15
 Ibid.  
16
 Ibid., 14.  
17
 Ibid., 16.  
18





the 1,000 battle-related deaths include only those among the qualified war participants. This  
 
includes personnel killed in combat as well as those who subsequently died from combat  
 
wounds or diseases contracted during the war.
20
   
 
Additionally, the 1,000 threshold has been relaxed to reflect 1,000 battle-deaths in total,  
 
as opposed to annually.  However, Small and Singer have been criticized for abandoning the  
 
annual death threshold because an end to the war would be coded when violence dropped below  
 
1,000 deaths. Since there is no longer an annual death count, multiple war start dates could be  
 




Organized armed forces are a requirement in the definition of war, and since most states  
 
possess them, the members of the interstate system were considered to be the predominant actor  
 
in war.  Membership in the interstate system was based on criteria of population, territory,  
 
sovereignty, independence, and diplomatic recognition.  A state is to be qualified as a war  
 
participant by meeting either one of the two criteria: a minimum of 100 domestic fatalities or a  
 
minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engaged in active combat.
22
   
 
Since non-state armed groups are generally smaller than states and have fewer resources  
 
than states, the individual does not have to meet the above mentioned requirements to be  
 
considered as a war participant.  Instead, the non-state armed groups are considered to be a war  




 Ibid., 15. 
21
 Sambanis, 819.  
22









   
 
Once the participants in the war have been identified, researchers must determine who is  
 
fighting whom within the state.  The party that caused the greatest number of battle-deaths was  
 
considered to be doing the bulk of the fighting; this ensures that researchers are properly  
 
identifying war participants that are engaged in the violence that is at the core of the war.
24
   
  
 The third criterion, the active involvement of the national government, requires that the  
 
government of the state fight against a non-state entity.
25
  The central government is defined as  
 
those forces that were at the start of the war in de facto control of the nation‟s institutions,  
 
regardless of the legality or illegality of their claim.
26
   
 
The COW Project considers national military forces, local police, and citizens who do  
 
not rebel, to be considered as part of the government.
27
  The non-state participants can include  
 
regional geopolitical units, non-territorial entities, or non-state armed groups that have no  
 
defined territorial bases, so long as the war is fought within the borders of the state.   
 
 The last criterion, effective resistance, requires that for a conflict to be considered a war,  
 
it must involve armed forces capable of effective resistance on both sides.
28
  There are two  
                                                 
23
 Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Codebook for the Intra-State War V.4.0. Definitions and Variables,” 4. Correlates of 
War homepage, www.correlatesofwar.org (accessed December 6, 2014). 
24
 Sarkees, “Codebook for the COW Typology of War,” 19. 
25
 Sarkees, “Codebook for the Intra-State War,” 2. 
26
 Ibid., 2-3. 
27





criteria for defining effective resistance, the first being that both sides had to be initially  
 
organized for violent conflict while being prepared to resist the attacks of their opponent.  The  
 
second is that the weaker side must be able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five  
 
percent of the number of fatalities it sustains, despite being unprepared to do so.  The purpose of  
 






When determining whether an armed conflict constitutes as an intrastate war, it is  
 
important to measure the duration of the conflict.  The duration typically relies on the war‟s start  
 
date, end date, and breaks in the hostilities.  The COW project considers intrastate war‟s formal  
 




  Should the hostilities precede the formal declaration, then the first day of combat is  
 
used.  In the event that there is no declaration, then the sustained continuation of military battle,  
 
producing the requisite number of battle deaths, is treated as war with the first day of combat  
 




The end date of the armed conflict may be an armistice or cease-fire agreement, as long  
 
as the conflict does not resume thereafter.
32
  If the armistice fails to halt the hostilities or there is  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
28
 Ibid., 2.   
29
 Ibid.  
30
 Small and Singer, 66.  
31
 Ibid.   
32





a delay between the cessation of military action, then the end date is the day that clearly  
 
separates the close of sustained military conflict.  Essentially, an intrastate war ends if: (1) there  
 
is a truce or other agreement that ends combat for a year or more; (2) the apparent defeat of one  
 
side, assuming there is no formal surrender or truce; or, (3) twelve consecutive months pass  
 
without 1,000 battle-deaths, in which the termination date of the war would be the last day that  
 




 An exception to properly calculating a war‟s duration is if there is a break in the fighting.   
 
If the fighting stopped for 30 days or less, then there is not considered to be a break.  However,  
 
if there was a cessation of hostilities that occurred for more than 30 days, then there was  
 
considered to be a break, in which the end date would be noted and a second start date would be  
 
noted when the war resumed.
34
  Breaks are not considered when measuring the overall duration  
 
of the war.  
 
 Sambanis offers a much more detailed measurement of civil war that is much different  
 
than the definition offered by the COW.  First, the parties must be politically and militarily  
 
organized, and their political objectives must be publically stated.  Similar to the COW, the  
 
government must be a principal combatant.   
 
However, Sambanis argues that in the absence of a functioning government, the party  
 
representing the government, or claiming to control the state domestically, must be a combatant  
                                                 
33
 Ibid., 21.  
34






in order to be considered an internal conflict.
35
  He also insists that insurgency groups must be  
 
locally represented and must recruit locally.   
 
Furthermore, the start year of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500  
 
to 1,000 deaths.  If the death total is not reached, then the war is considered to have started in  
 
that year only if the cumulative deaths in the next three years reach 1,000.
36
  However, this  
 
presents a problem with wars that do not reach 500 in the first year because researchers may not  
 
know whether the conflict should be considered a civil war until after three years, should the  
 
death count not reach 1,000. This additional stipulation could create prolonged confusion among  
 
researchers in regards to labeling the conflict improperly.   
  
Like Small and Singer, Sambanis also includes “effective resistance” in his measurement  
 
of civil war; however he requires the weaker party to inflict at least 100 deaths on the stronger  
 
party to qualify as effective resistance.  Sambanis also argues that if the fighting ceases and  
 
peace results for at least two years, then the civil war is considered to have ended.
37
 However, he  
 
offers no justification as to why there must be two years of peace, and not one or three.  It would  
 
be useful for readers to better understand his measurement of civil war if he explained why he  
 
requires two years of peace, as opposed to any other time period.   
 
 Finally, Sambanis insists that the war must take place within the territory of a state that is  
                                                 
35
 Sambanis, 829. 
36
 Ibid., 830. 
37






a member of the international system with a population of 500,000 or greater.
38
  Although the per  
 
capita death measure would allow the population threshold to be relaxed, it still presents a  
 
problem for those countries that have a population of less than 500,000, yet meet all other  
 
conditions to constitute as a “civil war.”   
 
For example, Malta has a population of 419,000 while Iceland has a population of only  
 




  It seems fallacious that the death count during a conflict is required to exceed the  
 
normal threshold of 1,000 battle deaths simply because the population is not greater than  
 
500,000.   
 
 Fearon and Laitin also have their own operationalization of “civil war,” in that it involves  
 
fighting between a state and non-state group who seek to take control of a government, take  
 




  Additionally, the conflict must have killed 1,000 people over the course of the fighting  
 
period, with a yearly average of at least 100 deaths.  Finally, at least 100 civilians and/or  
 
participants must have been killed on both sides to constitute as a “civil war.”  
 
                                                 
38
 Ibid. at 829 
39
 “Population, Total.” The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_
value-last&sort=asc, (December 26 2014).  
40
 James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?”  Journal of Peace Research 





The last criterion is intended to rule out massacres where there is no organized or  
 
effective opposition; however, including civilian deaths may still categorize the conflict as “civil  
 
war” despite being terrorist attacks or ethnic cleansings.  Another criticism is the overall 1,000  
 
deaths: it is too low because under this criterion, a conflict may continue for twenty years and  
 
still be labeled as a “civil war,” so long as there are 1,000 deaths, with 100 occurring annually.   
 
This relaxed approach inappropriately classifies low levels of violence as being civil wars, and  
 
could lead researchers to include cases in which there is no real threat to the state or political  
 
order.   
  
 This literature review now turns to the differentiation between “civil war” and “armed  
 
conflict,” as the two are often inappropriately used.  “Civil war” must not be confused with  
 
“armed conflict;” rather, the former is a type of the latter.  Armed conflict is defined as a  
 
contested incompatibility that concerns governments or territory or both where the use of armed  
 




Armed conflict is divided into three main subsets: (1) minor armed conflict; (2)  
 
intermediate armed conflict; and, (3) civil war.  Minor armed conflict consists of at least twenty- 
 
five battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of  
 
the conflict.   
 
Intermediate armed conflict consists of at least twenty-five battle-related deaths per  
 
                                                 
41





year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year.   
 
Civil war requires at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.
42
  Armed conflict is generally  
 
used to measure the level of intensity of conflict.  However, in this thesis, I am only concerned  
 
with the third subset of armed conflict: civil war.   
 
 Similarly, armed conflicts are also distinguished by type.  Following the COW Project‟s  
 
definitions, there four different types of armed conflict: first, there is interstate armed conflict,  
 
which occurs between two or more states.  Second, extrastate armed conflict, which occurs  
 
between a state and non-state group outside its own territory.  Armed conflict is also divided into  
 
colonial war and imperial wars.   
 
The third type is internationalized internal armed conflict, which occurs between the  
 
government of a state and internal opposition groups with interventions from other states.   
 
Finally, there is internal armed conflict, which occurs between the government of a state and  
 
internal opposition groups without intervention from other states.   
  
This thesis focuses only on internal armed conflict, which is also referred to as either  
 
“intrastate war” or “civil war.”  The reasoning for the interchangeability is because different  
 
scholars refer to internal conflict as either an “intrastate war” or “civil war,” despite having the  
 
same meaning.  Therefore, to be consistent with the literature, each word will be referenced as  
 
the author uses it, bearing in mind that the two terms have essentially the same meaning.   
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Causes of Civil War 
 
Between 1989 and 2000, there have been a staggering 465 conflicts, while there have  
 




  This disparity in the quantity of these conflicts is curious and has led political  
 
scientists to conduct empirical research in the attempt to discover the causes of these multifarious  
 
wars.   Table 1 illustrates the quantity of armed conflicts between 1989 and 2000.  
 
Over the past decade, there have been numerous quantitative studies that have been  
 
published with little consensus among scholars as to what directly causes civil war onset. Some  
 




  While advocates of the “ethnic fractionalization fueling internal conflict” argument  
 
may agree that ethnic diversity is conducive to civil war onset, the reasoning varies widely.   
 
Tanja Ellingsen (2000) analyzes the relationship between multiethnic states and domestic  
 




  Ellingsen looks at three different aspects of multiehtnicity that may influence whether a  
 
country becomes involved in domestic conflict or not.
46
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Table 1. Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict, 1989-2000 
Type of 
Conflict 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 














































































































The first is the degree of fragmentation within a country, being both the size and number  
 
of the largest linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups.  Ellingsen found that countries in which the  
 
size of the dominant group is less than 80 percent of the total population are more prone to  
 
domestic conflict than countries in which the dominant group equals or is higher than 80 percent  
 




The second aspect of multiethnicity is the size of the largest minority group within the  
 
country.  The presence of numerous groups often means that each group is small and, in turn, no  
 
minority group is large enough to mobilize to start conflict.
48
  The data supported her second  
 
hypothesis: conflict is higher in countries with several different ethnic groups than in those with  
 
few ethnic groups.  
 




  She argues that a minority within one country may be a majority within another.   
 
Consequently, this affects the size of the minority and its identification.
50
  Therefore, race,  
 






Ellingsen used Singer and Small‟s Correlates of War data set for civil war data in  
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addition to using Wallensteen and Sollenberg‟s data set for armed conflict.  Relying on  
 
regression analysis, her overall findings demonstrate that multiethnicity (measured in of the  
 
above-mentioned ways) has a strong and significant impact on domestic conflict.  
 
This is mainly attributed to the state‟s lack of recognizing and strengthening minority  
 
groups in addition to denying them equivalent political and economic rights.
52
  Giving minority  
 
groups the right to cultural self-expression without fear of political or economic repression could  
 
prevent them from mobilizing and creating conflict within the state.   
 
 Although Ellingsen‟s study has shown that multiethnicity within countries often results in  
 
domestic conflict, it does not correlate with countries such as Madagascar, Gabon, or Cameroon,  
 
all of which are highly multiethnic, yet have never experienced a civil war.   
 
For example, according to Alesina‟s, et al.‟s fractionalization data, Madagascar has an  
 
ethnic fractionalization score of .8791.
53
  The closer the score is to 1.000, the more ethnically  
 
heterogeneous the country is.  On the other hand, the closer the score is to 0.000, the more  
 
ethnically homogeneous the country is.
54
  By having a score .8791, Madagascar is highly  
 
ethnically heterogeneous yet has never experienced a civil war.  Similarly, Gabon has an ethnic  
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 In the context of Ellingsen‟s reasoning, Madagascar, Gabon, and Cameroon should have  
 
all experienced domestic conflict as a result of being highly multiethnic, yet they have not.   
 
Examining the relative minority size within Madagascar, we find that more than nine-tenths of  
 
the population is Malagasy, which is divided into approximately 20 ethnic groups.
56
  The largest  
 
and most dominant of the 20 ethnic groups is the Merina, which represents approximately a  
 
quarter of the 23.6 million citizens, while the other nineteen ethnic minority groups represent  
 
only a fraction of the population.   
  
 With a population of 1.7 million, Gabon has approximately 40 ethnic groups, in which  
 
the Fang account for more than one-fourth of the population whereas the Sira, the Nzebi, and the  
 
Mbete, jointly account for about one-third of the population.  In regards to Ellingsen‟s  
 
measurement of “multiethnicity,” the size of these minority groups are relatively large, yet have  
 




Finally, Cameroon has a population of 22.5 million, which is represented by an  
 
astounding 250 ethnic groups.
58
  The Bamileke and the Bamoun constitute 38 percent of  
 
the population while the Bakas account for about 18 percent of the population.  The Fulani  
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also account for 18 percent while the Bassa accounts for roughly 12 percent.  There are several  
 
minority groups that are equal in terms of size, with no ethnic group dominating the overall  
 
population. Therefore, Cameroon meets the criteria for civil war set by Ellingsen, yet the country  
 
has not experienced civil war or domestic conflict.
59
   
 
 What these three countries do have in common is that they are all former colonies of the  
 
French, and have gained their independence in 1960 as a result of the Algerian War.  Also, all  
 
three countries currently have republican governments.  These striking similarities could help  
 
explain why Madagascar, Gabon, and Cameroon are anomalies to Ellingsen‟s study.  However, it  
 
is unlikely that  multiethniciy alone will be enough to explain why civil war occurs.   
  
Similar to Ellingsen, Sambanis argues that ethnic heterogeneity is among the most  
 
significant and robust determinants of civil war onset.
60
  He analyzes the differences that exist  
 
between the causes of identity by means of ethnicity and religion, and nonidentity civil wars by  
 
using a cross-sectional time-series data set that includes economic, social, and political variables  
 
for 161 countries observed annually over a period from 1960 to 1999.
61
   
 
His findings reveal that politics is more important that economics in causing civil war  
 
because the deprivation of political rights causes repression, and may fuel rebellion against the  
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state.  Also, ethnic heterogeneity significantly increases the risk of civil war, determined by  
 
using the Ethnolinguistic fractionalization date set, created by Taylor and Hudson in 1972.
62
   
 
 Interestingly, Sambanis also argues that regional characteristics also influence patterns of  
 




  Civil wars occurring in neighboring countries may increase  
 




   
 
Sambanis labels “good neighborhoods” as having open political institutions that are not  
 
prone to internal conflict.  Additionally, good neighborhoods are able to help states overcome  
 
their political problems and offer mediation that prevent conflict escalation.  By contrast, “bad  
 
neighborhoods” have weak political institutions, which may cause political and economic  
 
grievance in other neighboring countries as a result of uncontrolled domestic ethnic hostility.   
  
The data showed that countries having land borders with countries experiencing civil war  
 
due to ethnic hostilities are significantly more likely to experience a civil war of their own.
65
   
 
Although regional unrest can certainly contribute to the likelihood of civil war onset in a  
 
neighboring country, Sambanis offers no root-cause explanation as to why civilians would want  
 
to rebel against their own government.   
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Surely, there must be an alternative reason as opposed to simply “everyone else is doing  
 
it.” Additionally, Sambanis‟s analysis cannot explain whether the spread of neighboring unrest  
 
fueling civil war is due to ethnic war spreading physically across borders to other ethnic groups  
 






In the same vein as Sambanis‟s argument for good/bad neighboring countries fueling  
 
civil war, Taydas et al. focuses on the importance of institutional quality.
67
  He argues that the  
 
absence of good quality institutions and effective governance structures creates suitable  
 
conditions for emergence of civil war.
68
  Unlike Sambanis, Taydas focuses on the lack of good  
 
quality institutions within the state that is experiencing the civil war, rather than the effect that  
 
these institutions have on neighboring countries.   
  
Taydas‟s overall argument is that states with high institutional-quality levels are less  
 
likely to experience civil war onset.
69
  This is mainly because these institutions will be  
 
responsive to the needs of their citizens in addition to solving problems beyond the use of only 
 
military action.  By contrast, a low institutional quality may lead to states losing the loyalty of its  
 
citizens, which would increase the likelihood of civil war.
70
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 The quality of institutions is measured by three components: corruption in the  
 
government, the rule of law tradition, and bureaucratic quality.
71
  These three components are  
 
appropriate since they demonstrate the ability of a government to implement institutional norms  
 
and rules that provide services in an efficient and non-discriminatory manner.
72
   
 
 Taydas‟s empirical analysis covers the years 1984 to 1999, in which the International  
 
Country Risk Group (ICRG) data set is used to gauge the quality of institutions.
73
  124 states are  
 
included in the study, all of which have a population of at least half a million in 1990.  The  
 
findings reveal that states with poor institutional quality in the form of high corruption, low  
 




  By having poor-quality institutions, the legitimacy in the government is decreased, which  
 
creates grievances among the population and can, in turn, facilitate the emergence of conflict.   
  
To measure for corruption, Taydas uses the ICRG‟s measurement of corruption in the 
 
government, which ranges from zero (being the most corrupt) to six (no corruption).
75
  This  
 
variable measures the following: financial corruption in the form of demands or special  
 
payments, bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments,  
 
police protection, corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, and secret party  
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However, Taydas does not explain how the ICRG gathers its data that includes these  
 
types of corruption.  Because corruption is not public information and is most often done in  
 
secrecy, it is incredibly difficult to accurately determine whether officials are indeed corrupt.    
 
Furthermore, Taydas argues that the prevalence of poor governance, which is measured  
 




  It also creates a gap between ordinary citizens and state institutions that generates  
 
distrust, dissatisfaction, and grievances within the entire political system. As this gap widens, the  
 
risk of internal conflict increase and “…existing tensions between groups can worsen.”
78
   
 
There are two problems with this particular argument: first, it is assumed that the  
 
citizens are aware of the corruption, but the findings do not address situations in which there is  
 
massive governmental corruption, yet the citizens are not aware.  If citizens are not aware of the  
 
corruption taking place within the government, then it is unlikely that a gap will be created, thus  
 
neither generating distrust nor dissatisfaction with the political system. Therefore, it would be  
 
useful to not only gauge the corruption within an existing government, but also the citizens‟  
 
awareness of such corruption.   
 
Secondly, Taydas argues that existing tensions between groups could worsen as a  
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consequence of citizens‟ distrust with the government; however, he does not address which  
 
groups are being referenced.  Thus, it is unclear whether he is referring to ethnic groups, political  
 
organizations, rebel groups, etc.   
 
Overall, Taydas offers a compelling argument on the usefulness of good quality  
 
institutions as a preventative of civil war onset.  While I agree that good quality institutions  
 
are immensely important for sustaining peace, it is not the sole cause of civil war onset because  
 
there must be incentives for citizens to rebel, which is not addressed in Taydas‟s study.  
 
 Other studies suggest that civil wars generally result from a combination of greed,  
 
opportunity, and grievance.  The initial motivation to rebel is the subject of much controversy,  
 
and much of the debate has been based on the „greed versus grievance‟ discourse.  Grievance  
 
generally refers to repression or suffering; whereas, opportunity generally refers to rebels having  
 
enough freedom to organize and access to finances, weapons, and soldiers.   
 
With regard to the root cause of civil war, Collier and Hoeffler have introduced their own  
 
conceptual dichotomy of greed versus grievance.  Rebellion generally occurs when grievances  
 
are severe enough that citizens want to engage in some type of violent protest.
79
   
 
Such rebellions are motivated by grievances, which refers to the discontent and  
 
frustration that citizens have due to high economic inequality, ethnic or religious hatred, political  
 
repression, or political exclusion.
80
  More generally, grievance can also be created from a sense  
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of injustice, including relative deprivation, collective disadvantages, and inequality that provide  
 
groups with motivation to use violent means against the government.
81
  Foreign military  
 
intervention could cause or disrupt any of the four mentioned grievances, thus fueling internal  
 
conflict.  This is expounded on later in this chapter.   
 
Contrarily, rebellions that generate profits from looting are motivated by greed, which  
 
then generates profitable opportunities for rebels.
82
  Oil, diamonds, timber, and other primary  
 




  Over the years, Collier and Hoeffler have broadened their original  
 
conceptualization by shifting from greed to “opportunity,” referring to the factors that facilitate  
 




According to Collier and Hoeffler, civil war is to be viewed as the outcome of an  
 
expected utility calculation; whereby, potential rebels would evaluate their expected gains from  
 
war and compare gains with expected losses.
85
  This cost-benefit analysis is considered to be  
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“opportunity costs” of forgoing productive economic activity.  Therefore, rebellion is a rational  
 
decision.   
 
To help explain rebellion, Collier and Hoeffler test three indicators of opportunity and  
 




 In an empirical investigation of conflict, Collier and Hoeffler considered three qualitative  
 
indicators of opportunity, namely those that help finance rebellion: extortion of natural resources,  
 
donations from diasporas, and subventions from hostile governments.
86
  The natural resource  
 
indicator was proxied by the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP for 161 countries over  
 
a period of thirty-five years starting in 1960 and ending in 1995.
87
  The subsequent five years  
 
was then considered to be an „episode‟ and compared to those in which a civil war occurred and  
 
to those that were conflict-free.   
  
Collier and Hoeffler then proxied the size of a country‟s diaspora, the second source of  
 
rebel finance, by its emigrants living in the United States.  By using U.S. Census data, diasporas  
 
living in other countries are neglected; however, doing so ensures uniformity in the aggregate in  
 
that all are in the same legal, organizational, and economic environment.
88
  The emigrant  
 
population is then taken as a proportion of the population in the country of origin.   
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 The third source of rebel financing, from hostile governments, is proxied as the  
 
willingness of foreign governments to finance military opposition to the incumbent government.   
 
The data is collected during the Cold War, in which each great power supported rebellions in  
 
countries allied to the opposing power.
89
  However, eleven of the seventy-nine wars occurred  
 
after the cold war; therefore, results for this variable may be slightly skewed since there is no  
 
data offered for the eleven wars.    
  
The study then turns to four qualitative indicators of grievances mentioned earlier: ethnic  
 
or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality.
90
  Since  
 
ethnic and religious hatred can generally only occur in societies that are multi-ethnic or multi- 
 
religious, the indicator is proxied as fractionalization and polarization.   
 
 The second indicator, political repression, was measured by the Polity IV data set, which  
 
measures political right on a scale from zero to ten, with zero meaning no political rights and ten  
 
representing substantial political rights. Political exclusion represents the minority, which may  
 
be most vulnerable if the largest ethnic group constitutes a small majority.  If the largest ethnic  
 
group constitutes 45-90 percent of the population, it is referred to as „ethnic dominance,‟ which  
 
results in the exclusion of the minority groups.
91
   
  
Economic inequality was measured by the GINI coefficient and by the ratio of the top-to- 
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After conducting a logit regression for all seven opportunity and grievance indicators  
 
explained above, the data revealed that extortion of natural resources was highly significant  
 
while subventions from hostile governments was not.  The diaspora variable was positive and  
 




  However, because people tend to emigrate to the United States when civil wars  
 
occur, the size of the diaspora may be proxying the intensity of conflict.  In turn, the results may  
 
be spurious and could be why the data indicates that intense conflicts have a high risk of  
 
repetition.   
 
 In regards to grievance as the explanation of rebellion indicators, the data revealed that  
 
the ethnic and religious tensions were insignificant.  Ethnic and religious fractionalization,  
 
religious polarization, and ethnic dominance were all insignificant.
94
  As expected, repression  
 
increases the risk of conflict.  Finally, neither the income inequality nor land inequality variables  
 
were significant.   
 
As Collier and Hoeffler argue, the results indicate that the opportunities for rebellion  
 
helps to explains civil conflict better than the objective indicators of grievance, which add little  
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    Overall, factors such as inequality, political rights, and ethnic and  
 
religious identity have been ruled out as causing internal conflict.  Instead, explaining  
 
opportunity as conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretation of rebellion as greed- 
 




A problem with Collier and Hoeffler‟s study is that they take an individualistic approach  
 
in regards to grievance indicators.  The model assumes that every participant of the conflict must  
 
experience inequality, ethnic or religious hatred, political exclusion, or repression.  However,  
 
many rebels may not be motivated at all; rather they are simply free riders that seek incentives by  
 
others that have already laid the groundwork.    
 
 Additionally, grievance itself is difficult to proxy.  For example, researchers cannot  
 
assume that because a state is highly fractionalized or has a dominant ethnic group, the diversity  
 
will fuel ethnic hatred and cause minorities to rebel.   
 
Similarly, it is impossible to know whether a person made the decision to rebel due to  
 
religious polarization, unless of course that person is surveyed or asked directly by the  
 
researcher,  both being highly unlikely to produce honest answers.  Therefore, because grievance  
 
as motivation is so personal and may be different for every rebel, Collier and Hoeffler are  
 
working with assumptions as opposed to raw data that do in fact represent the rebels‟ motivation  
 
to rebel.    
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 Regan and Norton argue that grievance-based issues are at the core of the process that  
 




  To avoid defection, rebel leaders must pay selective benefits to the rebel  
 
participants.   
 
Doing so is much easier when extractable resources are contested and controlled by the  
 
rebel forces.  Therefore, grievance is the foundation by which protest and rebellion movements  
 
occur but resources are necessary to obtain so that selective benefits can be paid to the rebels in  
 
the attempt to keep the rational rebel soldier supporting the rebellion.
98
  This will, in turn, offset  
 




 To test their hypotheses, Regan and Norton conduct logit analysis on a number of  
 
variables including discrimination, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and access to extractable  
 
resources. Respectively, the data is derived from various sources: the Minorities Against Risk  
 
scale to measure discrimination, Sambanis‟s data on fractionalization, and various data from the  
 
Diamond Registry, the National Gemstone Association, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency  
 
to determine rebels access to extractable resources. 
   
 Although much of the current debate suggests that access to resources facilitates the  
 
mobilization process, the data revealed that extractable resources (using diamonds, gemstones,  
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and opiates) has no relationship with the onset of protest or rebellion.
100
  In fact, access to these  
 
resources may actually decrease the probability of civil war onset.   
 
Disappointedly, Regan and Norton do not expound on why natural resources may  
 
decrease the likelihood of the civil war onset.  Perhaps the reason why there is no relationship  
 
between the two is because of the lack of access rebel leaders have to the resources.  Another  
 
reason could be because diamonds and gemstones are usually mined in industrialized states, and  
 
rebellion tends to occur more in underdeveloped states.    
 
Shifting the discussion to the correlation between government repression and civil war,  
 
lagging levels of political repression is generally a strong predicator of the level of civil unrest.   
 
Regan and Norton used the Political Terror scale to determine whether there is a correlation  
 
between civil unrest and governmental repression.
101
   
 
The results indicate that when a country is highly autocratic, there is a considerably lower  
 
probability of violent rebellion.
102
 Contrarily, when the political institutions allow some forms of  
 




According to these results, if a state engages in high levels of political repression, then  
 
the likelihood of nonviolent protests decreases significantly, whereas if a state does not repress,  
 
protests will increase significantly. Yet, results also suggest that highly repressive states have a  
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far greater probability of experiencing a civil war.  This seems counterintuitive because it does  
 
not follow the main argument that grievance-based issues are at the core of the process that  
 
leads to civil conflict. 
 
 For example, if rebel leaders use state resources to incentivize participants of the protest,  
 
the rebellion will likely continue and turn violent in the attempt to further the goals of the  
 
rebellion.  Citizens in highly repressive states, arguably, have more grievance-based issues than  
 
those in low repressive states; therefore, it would seem that highly repressive states would have  
 
more civil wars than low repressive states.   
 
Although Regan and Norton briefly state the results of the data, they do not expound of  
 
the reasons why the results undercut their main thesis.  Being experts in the field of political  
 
science, it would have been helpful to understand the logic, or at least theories, as to why the  
 
results rebut their main argument.   
 
 One way in which a rebellion or protest will cease is if the rebel leaders are not able to  
 
use state resources to pay the soldiers‟ for their labor.  Regan and Norton focus on precious  
 




  However, precious stones are often mined in industrialized countries that, in  
 
general, experience less rebellion than others.  Therefore, focusing on resources such as oil, coal,  
 
and other fossil fuels could have led to different results that could refine our understanding of the  
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correlation between extractable resources and civil war onset.   
 
Regan and Norton also found that ethnolinguistic heterogeneity significantly increased  
 




  Although the scholars do not explain this relationship in detail, it  
 
seems to be consistent with reasoning the offered by Sambanis and Ellington, discussed earlier in  
 
the chapter.   
 
 There is ample literature on the correlation between ethnic fractionalization and  
 
civil war onset, and it is perhaps the most debated cause of civil war.  Contrary to Regan and  
 
Norton, Fearon and Laitin completely disregard the argument that a greater degree of ethnic or  
 
religious diversity makes a country more prone to civil war.
106
  Rather, it is conditions such as  
 




   
 
To test their theory, Fearon and Laitin gathered data for 161 countries, all of which had a  
 
population of at least half a million in 1990, for the years 1945 to 1999.
108
  Data were gathered  
 
from the commonly used Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, the CIA Factbook, and Grimes  
 
and Grimes‟s data on languages spoken within a country‟s population.
109
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The results indicated that ethnic and religious fractionalization as cause of civil war were  
 
statistically insignificant when using the Ethnolinguistic fractionalozation index and the CIA  
 
Factbook.  Even when using the Grimes and Grimes data that measured the proportion of the  
 




  The ethnic diversity measures do show a strong relationship with civil  
 
war onset, however, this relationship ceases when income is controlled for.   
 
 Fearon and Laitin also found little evidence that a civil war will break out where political  
 
grievances are strongest.  If this were so, then political democracies and states that observe civil  
 
liberties would be not be expected to experience civil war, whereas dictatorships would.   
 
Furthermore, states that discriminate against minority religions or languages would be  
 
more likely to experience civil war.  However, when comparing states exhibiting these  
 
characteristics to per capita income, the data does not reflect these expectations.
111
   
 
 Civil violence is explained by neither ethnic nor religious grievances, but rather  
 
conditions that favor insurgency.
112
  Insurgency is defined as technology or military conflict that  
 
is characterized by small armed participants that conduct guerilla warfare from rural based areas.  
 
Governments that are weak are attractive for insurgencies, and there is often a propensity for  
 
brutal and indiscriminate retaliation that helps drive rebel forces.
113
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Although grievances may motivate rebels, it is unlikely that factors of grievances will be  
 
the sole cause of civil war.  Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin completely refute the commodity  
 
exports fueling civil war argument, offered by Collier and Hoeffler, by finding no significance  
 




 Interestingly, mountainous terrain is significantly related to civil war onset. For example,  
 
countries that are half “mountainous” have a 13.2 percent chance of civil war occurring, whereas  
 
the chances of civil war occurring is cut into half for countries that are not mountainous.
115
 The  
 
logic behind these results is that insurgency is favored by rough terrain because the rebels have  
 
local knowledge of the population and geography of the country.
116
  By knowing the landscape  
 
of the country thoroughly, rebels are able to hide from superior government forces.   
 
 Per capita income is also strongly significant in that $1,000 less in income is associated  
 
with 41 percent greater annual odds of civil war onset.
117
  Even within the poorest regions (such  
 
as former colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia) those countries that estimate $1,000 or   
 




Although the overall study is a valid contribution to the literature, Fearon and Laitin  
 
prematurely dismiss the effect that ethnic fractionalization has on civil war onset.  For example,  
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they argue that conditions favoring insurgency, such as state weakness marked by poverty, a  
 
large population, and instability are better predicators of civil war onset, as opposed to  
 
grievances such as economic inequality, ethnic, and linguistic fractionalization.
119
   
 
However, decolonization is argued to be the cause of the robustness of civil wars during  
 




  Because a state is poor and has a weak government and military does not in and of  
 
itself make it more conducive to civil war. There has to be some underlying reason why citizens  
 
would rebel against their government.  Of course, a country that has rough terrain may make it  
 
easier for citizens to rebel, but it is not the reason that they rebel in the first place. In fact, deeply  
 
rooted ethnic hatred that has been suppressed by colonization then unleashed during  
 
decolonization would be a better explanation for civil war onset as opposed to state weakness or  
 
poverty.   
 
Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin have argued that countries with a lower per capita income  
 
are more likely to experience civil war.  However, there is no reason or justification given for  
 
this argument. In countries that have a large ethnic majority and several minorities may  
 
experience high income inequality, whereby the minorities rebel due to grievances.  The findings  
 
offered by Fearon and Laitin are interesting nonetheless, but it would give more credibility  
 
to the study if  theories were offered that justified the results from the data.   
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  In contrast to Collier and Hoeffler, it is not the economic factors that  
 




   Rather than restricting the study only to ethnic heterogeneity as many  
 
scholars have done, Reynal-Querol analyzes the effect that religious polarization and animist  
 
diversity have on the incidence of ethnic civil war.
123
   
 
Using the Barro‟s data set, which is derived from the World Christian Encyclopedia,  
 
Reynal-Querol gives special importance to the religious dimensions of ethnicity.
124
  The results  
 
indicated a positive and significant effect of animist diversity on the onset of ethnic civil war.
125
   
 
Even when including religious polarization and animist diversity together, the results are still  
 




 Furthermore, religious polarization was found to be more important as a social cleavage  
 
that can develop into civil war, more so than linguistic differences.
127
  These important religious  
 
differences are a strong predicator for explaining domestic conflict.   
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 Perhaps the reason why scholars are finding such different results when controlling for  
 
ethnic fractionalization is because each researcher uses a different definition of “ethnicity.”  For  
 
example, Fearon and Laitin define an ethnic group as, “a group larger than a family for which  
 
membership is reckoned primarily by descent, is conceptually autonomous, and has a  
 
conventionally recognized „natural history‟ as a group.”
128
   
 
Marta Reynal-Querol defines ethnicity as a combination of language, religion, and color,  
 
whereby the tensions caused by linguistic differences and the loss of communication that they  
 
generate can emerge in a situation very different from those generated by religion.
129
  These  
 
linguistic and religious differences causes splits within societies, and form the basis of  
 
identifying with a particular ethnic group.   
 
Other scholars, such as Sambanis and Regan and Norton, rely on Horowitz‟s definition of  
 
ethnicity.  Horowitz defines “ethnicity” as “being based on a myth of collective ancestry, which  
 
usually carries with it traits believed to be innate.  Some notion of ascription, however diluted,  
 
and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity.”
130
   
 
These different definitions of “ethnicity” are likely to result in different categorizations of  
 
ethnic groups, as the criteria will be different for each researcher. Scholars studying the causes of  
 
civil war should use the same operationalization of “ethnicity” so that there is more cohesion for  
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this particular argument within the literature.   
 
Turning away from the ethnic, economic and political repression grievances, other  
 
scholars have focused on regime type  as an indicator of civil war onset.  Hegre et al. argue that  
 
domestic violence is associated with political change and contrary to what has been argued in the  
 




 By conducting an empirical analysis that uses data from 152 countries from the years  
 
1816 to 1992, Hegre et al. explore the direction and magnitude of political change.
132
   
 




  Countries experiencing political change are also conducive to civil war  
 
because the central government is seen as vulnerable, thus giving rebels an opportunity to come  
 
to power.   
 
The researchers also used the Correlates of War data to contract their dependent variable,  
 
Polity IV for one of their independent variables (regime change), and various other data  
 
resources for the control variables.
134
  The data revealed that regimes that score in the middle  
 
range on the democracy-autocracy index have a significantly higher probability of civil war than  
 
either fully developed democracies or autocracies.
135
  Additionally, regime change strongly  
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increases the probability of civil war.
136
  These results offer an interesting question as to whether  
 
democratization facilitates civil war; however, this issue exceeds the scope of this thesis and,  
 
therefore, will not be addressed.  
 
Overall, Hegre et al. offer an interesting analysis on the relationship between  
 
regime type and civil war onset.  To have a better understanding of the contemporary effect that  
 
regime type and regime change have on likelihood of civil, perhaps Hegre et al. should have only  
 
included civil wars that occurred after the end of WWII.  The causes of civil war were much  
 
different in 1816 than they are in more recent years due to the advancement of technology.   
 
Therefore, including those that occurred 200 years ago may not provide the most accurate  
 
information for contemporaneous purposes.  
  
Additionally, Hegre et al. did not give any reason as to why an intermediate regime  
 
would be more conducive to civil war onset.  The researchers cited several scholars that have  
 
offered their own theories on why regime change affects the likelihood of civil war, but do not  
 
take a formal position or offer any theories of their own. Perhaps citizens may feel more  
 
aggrieved from transforming from an autocracy to democracy, or vice versa, therefore they rebel  
 
against the government to promote their own ideological views.  
 
Another theory may be that the rebels regard the government as being unstable due to the  
 
fact that it does not have a coherent regime type, given that the government is neither fully  
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democratic nor autocratic.  Either the grievance based or opportunistic based theory may be a  
 
reason why rebels would violently resist their government.   
 
In general, grievance-based motives of civil war onset, such as ethnic and religious  
 
fractionalization, and democratic and autocratic regimes, have received inconsistent support  
 
within the existing literature.
137
  There is little consensus as to whether grievances are the direct  
 
cause of civil war partly because the evidence is at odds with such a large body of theoretical  
 




   
 
Bodea and Elbadawi attempt to clear up the muddiness of the numerous arguments  
 
relevant to economic and regime type conduciveness to civil war onset.  They do so by  
 
conducting a study that incorporates all of the variables tested by the notable scholars while  
 
providing a concise literature review that compacts exactly who said what. Given the  
 
overwhelming literature on civil war and contradictory theories, such a compacted study is  
 
helpful for new researchers.  
 
To start, Bodea and Elbadawi argue that the combination of low income and low  
 
standards of democracy are likely to be associated with high probability of violence, regardless  
 
of social characteristics within a society.  High income reduces the risk of civil war because  
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richer countries have a greater capacity to react to emerging rebellions. Additionally, in wealthier  
 
countries the opportunity costs of rebellion are larger.
139
    This is similar to the economic  
 
argument presented by Collier and Hoeffler.   
  
The researchers also investigate the role that social fractionalization and regime type have  
 
on the onset of political violence.
140
  Referring to the Polity IV data set, full autocracies involve  
 
repressed political participation with no official elections; partial autocracies involve either a  
 
small degree of competitive political participation or elections for the executive; and partial  
 
democracies have a higher degree of political participation and elections.
141
   Interestingly,  
 
interregnum periods and transition periods were characterized by either the collapse of the state  
 
or reciprocity between characteristics of the new and old regimes.
142
   
  
Similar to Regan and Norton, Bodea and Elbadawi found that extractable resources,  
 
notably diamonds, gemstones, and opiates, were statistically insignificant.
143
  Even when  
 
including oil exports, the results were still insignificant.  In contrast to what Fearon and Laitin  
 
argued, the presence of mountainous terrain was did not affect the likelihood of civil war.  
 
 Bodea and Elbadawi found that richer countries do experience less violent contestation of  
 
political unrest, while countries with a higher per capita displayed a lower chance of  
 
                                                 
139
 Ibid., 9.   
140
 Ibid., 14.  
141
 Ibid., 15.  
142
 Ibid.  
143







  While Fearon and Laitin found that anocracies are more prone to civil  
 
war than autocracies and democracies since they are weak and incoherent regimes, Bodea and  
 
Elbadawi found that democracies are less likely than autocracies to experience civil war.
145
  In  
 
fact, the researchers did not find all anocracies to be weak political regimes because they have  
 
the ability to contain all types of conflict.
146
    
 
The problem with anocracies as being prone to civil war is not because they are an  
 
unstable mix of democratic and autocratic features, as Fearon and Laitin assert, but the problem  
 
is that they have both institutional openness and political participation channeled through  
 
networks rooted in traditional identities.
147
  Furthermore, the countries that were most vulnerable  
 
to conflict are partial democracies, given that they are open to recruitment of leaders and political  
 
participation faces a large risk of conflict.
148
   
 
 Fearon and Laitin‟s measures were used to capture the degree of ethnic, religious, and  
 
linguistic fractionalization in societies, in addition to Reynal-Querol‟s polarization measures to  
 
test the effect of social diversity.
149
  As hypothesized, all three types of fractionalization increase  
 
the risk of civil war.
150
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Specifically, ethnic fractionalization remains statistically significant when religious and  
 
linguistic fractionalization are included.  Contrary to Reynal-Querol‟s findings, all three aspects  
 
of polarization are insignificant, which supports the hypothesis that there is a monotonic  
 




The reason that ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization are so prone to civil war  
 
is because existing lines of identity and contestation will provide motivational and informational  
 
advantage to potential rebel leaders to grow a rebel organization.
152
  However, fractionalization  
 
is not likely to affect lower levels of violence, such as coups or riots, because they require other  
 
types of organizational advantages such as insider police and military information.  Thus, that is  
 




To sum, this model provides an excellent theory for grievance factors, particularly social  
 
fractionalization and democracy, as strong determinants for civil war.
154
  This theory suggests  
 
that both grievances, in addition to economic factors, are relevant in the analysis of political  
 
violence, and the failure of the civil war literature to account for these findings will only stagnate  
 
the progression of understanding the causes of civil war. 
 
To conclude this portion of the literature review, there has been ample empirical research  
 
conducted particularly over the last twenty years regarding the causes of civil war, yet there is  
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little consensus among scholars.  There have been a modicum of studies conducted on the  
 
relationship between foreign military intervention and civil war onset, by which the latter is a  
 
consequence of the former.   However, no study has categorized interventions by type.    
 
Therefore, it is the goal of this thesis to contribute to literature on civil war by  
 
determining whether foreign military intervention facilitates civil war onset.  If the data reveal  
 
that there is causal relationship, then determining which purposes of intervention are most  
 
conducive to civil war onset will be important in the further understanding of the causes of civil  
 
war onset.    
 
Types of Foreign Military Interventions 
 
 Why countries intervene militarily into the internal affairs of another is a difficult  
 
question to answer, which may explain why comparatively few political scientists have  
 
attempted to answer it.  Perhaps the lack of explanation is because each intervention is unique  
 
and circumstantial.  Therefore, it is difficult to generalize “intervention” itself.  Nevertheless,  
 
there have been researchers who have attempted to tackle this complex topic.   Although the  
 
studies have tended to be either case specific or relating to the morality of intervention, neither  
 
of which are of any interest in this thesis. 
 
 Before discussing the different types of international interventions analyzed in this thesis,  
 
there needs be a distinction made between “invasion” and “intervention.”  An invasion is a  
 






controlled by a sovereign nation.
155
 Combatants generally invade a nation with the objective of  
 
conquering, liberating, or establishing either control or authority over a territory.
156
   
 
Consequently, the government of the sovereign nation may be forced to partition part of the  
 
country, or it may be forced to relinquish the sovereignty of the country altogether.   
 
An invasion can be a cause of war, it can be a part of a larger strategy to end a war, or it  
 
can result in an interstate war, should the target country choose to defend its land.  Invasions are  
 




In this thesis, I define “foreign military intervention” as: “the movement of troops or  
 
military forces by one independent country, or a group of countries in concert, across the border  
 
of another independent country (or colony of an independent country), or actions by troops  
 
already stationed in the target state.”
158
   
 
 Thus, an invasion tends to be hostile and self-interested for the intervening country in its  
 
nature.  By contrast, an intervention is a broader term, and can include many different types of  
 
motivations for conducting the intervention.  Therefore, I will refer to interventions throughout  
 
this study, rather than defining them as “invasions.”  
 
 This thesis focuses on nine types of interventions, the first which occurs when an  
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intervener intervenes for the purpose of taking sides in a domestic dispute The second type of  
 
intervention occurs when the intervener attempts to affect domestic policies.  The third type of  
 
intervention is motivated by protecting a socio-ethnic faction or minority of the target country.   
 
Fourth, a country may decide to intervene in a sovereign country for the purpose of pursuing a  
 
Rebel or terrorist forces that happens to be crossing the border of the sovereign country.   
 
A country may also decide to intervene for the purpose of protecting economic or  
 
resource interests of self or allies.  The most common intervention that occurred in between 1980  
 
and 2000 in The Middle East and North African regions was the strategic intervention with the  
 
goal of stability, regional power balances, or pursuing ideological goals.  The seventh type of  
 




 century.  The eighth type of intervention occurs when a country is attempting to acquire  
 
or retain territory that is in danger of being deprived from the intervener.   
 
Finally, a country often intervenes for the purpose of protecting military property or  
 
diplomatic interests.  Any other purpose not mentioned above, even if related to foreign military  
 
intervention, exceeds the scope of this thesis and will, therefore, not be discussed.  
 
 In regards to the first type of intervention, Pearson argues that there are four reasons why  
 
a country may intervene into a domestic dispute of another country.  First, the domestic conflict  
 






being dispatched into the target state.
159
  Second, domestic conflict may exist in the intervener  
 




   
 
Third, as a consequence of forces independently moving into the target state and causing  
 
conflict or disruption, the intervener might be obligated to send in reinforcements.  Fourth, if  
 
troops in the target country become embroiled in long foreign commitments, the home-front  
 
population may grow disunified and rebel.  The intervener may dispatch troops to assist either  
 
the central government or rebels.
161
   
 
 Pearson compared data on foreign military interventions from 1960 to 1967, in addition  
 
to domestic conflict during the same period.
162
  The results indicated that domestic conflicts were  
 
not sufficient conditions for outside foreign military intervention; however, countries with ample  
 






 A large body of literature focuses on third-party interventions in a particular type of  
 
domestic dispute, civil wars, whereby the intervener dispatches troops to reinforce either the  
 
central government or the rebels.  An intervener‟s choice to intervene in a civil war depends on  
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  Decisions to intervene in a civil war are also affected by dynamic processes  
 
within the target state, rather than on fixed country characteristics.
165
      
  
Interventions in civil wars, regardless of which side the intervener supports, influences  
 
the course and nature of the warfare in civil wars.
166
 Foreign assistance by means of intervention  
 
alters the balance of military capabilities between the two sides, which, in turn, is responsible for  
 






Similar to the first type of intervention, states may also choose to intervene in an attempt  
 
to affect domestic policies of the target state. For example, when a central government is absent  
 




 Foreign governments often assume that it can intervene in a state that has  
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However, this assumption often overlooks the possibility of either the intervention failing  
 
or implementing a regime change that will result in rebellion by the citizens; thus, sparking civil  
 






States may also intervene for the purpose of protecting a socio-ethnic faction or a  
 
minority group.  Fox (2001) suggests that a state will intervene into another to protect an  
 
ethnic minority due to having a similar religious affiliation with the citizens of the target state.   
 
The ethnic affinity one government has for the citizens of another state is due to emotional ties  
 
created by shared ethnic identity that can create a feeling of responsibility for oppressed citizens  
 
of the same ethnicity living elsewhere.
171
   
 
 Furthermore, the majority of foreign interveners have a similar religion to those  
 
minorities on whose behalf they intervene.
172
 Interestingly, religious conflicts that involve  
 
Christian or Muslim minorities have attracted foreign military intervention approximately ten  
 
times as often as conflict involving other religious minorities.
173
  These findings strongly indicate  
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 Perhaps another reason why a country intervenes in another for the purpose of protecting  
 




  Under this doctrine, the Genocide Convention has set the precedent for a moral  
 
obligation that has driven the world to continue the evolution of universalistic agreements, in  
 
addition to the encouragement of government to protect all persons from harm.
176
   
 
In turn, the International Criminal Court has been established to hold persons and  
 
governments accountable that do not uphold this morality standard.  Therefore, every  
 
government in the international community has a moral obligation to intervene in a country  
 
should any citizens need protection.  More often than not, it is either an ethnic faction or a  
 
minority group that needs protection.   
 
 A country may intervene in another if the intervening government is actively pursuing a  
 
specific group of rebels or terrorists.  Azam and Thelen found that the United States, in  
 
particular, have intervened in various countries militarily, motivated by pursuing terrorists as  
 
opposed to having a geo-strategic interests.
177
  In fact, a deployment of U.S. troops reduces the  
 




 In the same vein, Sheehan collected transnational terrorism data from 1993 through 2004  
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and found that the number of United States foreign military interventions had substantially  
 
increased in the last twenty years due to the “Global War on Terror.”
179
  In the unfortunate  
 
event that a country is a haven for terrorists or is host to a rebellion group being pursued are  
 
conditions conducive for foreign military intervention.
180
  Military interventions tend to be more  
 
hostile if an intervener intervenes for the purpose of attacking terrorists that are being harbored  
 




 Economic or resource interests are another reason why a country might intervene in  
 
another.  Albosnoz insists that foreign military intervention is most likely to originate from  
 
countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias, in addition to destinations  
 
where foreign direct investment is highly profitable.
182
  Absent a motive to protect foreign direct  
 
investment, a government is unlikely to intervene.
183
   
 
 However, middle and small powers are unlikely to be in a position to intervene to protect  
 
economic interests because most of their economic ties are to large powers.
184
  Contrarily, great  
 
powers are much more likely than small and middle powers to intervene in an effort to protect  
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 A government‟s interest in another‟s natural resources can also be a motive for military  
 
intervention.  For example, dependence on oil for energy, the necessity of water for its citizens,  
 




  By intervening and confiscating the valuable resources, the intervener has the  
 
potential to generate both wealth and political power.
187
   
 
However, the consequence of intervening for economic or resource interest could make  
 




  As a result, the intervention may provoke violent retaliation or may fuel  
 
instability that causes citizens to rebel against their government since it would be seen as weak  
 
for allowing the intervention to occur.  
 
 Countries have been intervening in sovereign nations for the purpose of strategically  
 
pursuing ideological goals since the recognition of nation-states.  A relatively more recent  
 
phenomenon, however, is intervening strictly for the purpose of democratizing a country.  If a  
 
democratic country were to intervene in a non-democratic country, democracy can have a  
 
positive impact on the target state if the intervener were to promote free and fair elections during  
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 Perhaps an even more recent phenomenon, nuclear arms, is another reason why countries  
 
may or may not intervene in others.  Tillema argues that since overt military intervention is the  
 
most grievous form of punishment, obtaining nuclear weapons may prevent foreigners from  
 
invading and, thus, serves as a deterrent.
190
   Therefore, if a country has a nuclear weapon, it is  
 
less likely to be intervened.   
 
The theory of “nuclear paralysis” suggests that military forces have lost much of its  
 
traditional utility for great powers in the nuclear age due to their fear that armed conflict may  
 
expand to nuclear war, resulting in catastrophe for everyone.
191
  Those countries that do not have  
 
nuclear weapons are particularly vulnerable, and great powers may intervene at leisure given that  
 
they generally have the resources to do so.  
 
 Humanitarian intervention is perhaps the most commonly discussed type of intervention  
 
within the literature.  Intervening for humanitarian purposes is justified by implementation of the  
 
“Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, which is enforced by the United Nations.  The doctrine  
 
suggests that sovereignty is not an absolute right, and states forfeit aspects of their sovereignty  
 
when they fail to protect their citizens from crimes of atrocity.
192
  Such crimes include genocide,  
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 A country may also intervene for the purpose of either acquiring or retaining territory.   
 
Pearson suggests that an intervention could occur whereby the intervener may use fear of  
 
contagion as an excuse to justify the intervention in order to conceal the real interest, which is  
 
taking territory while the target state is preoccupied in a domestic dispute.
194
  Clashes in disputed  
 




 No surprisingly, interventions for the purpose of acquiring territory are most likely to  
 
occur within 3,000 miles of the intervener‟s capital.
196
  Neighboring states that tend to be  
 
unstable by nature are more vulnerable to intervention.  Furthermore, interventions against the  
 
target state reduce the government‟s ability to maintain full control over the entire national  
 
territory due to its coercive and administrative capacity being diminished by the intervention.
197
   
 
This gives the intervening country not only an advantage in acquire the targeting  
 
country‟s territory, but also an incentive to do so. Consequently, the target state‟s inability to  
 
maintain control may provide opportunities for rebel groups to have greater access to state  
 
resources and other essential materials.
198
  The instability caused by the intervention could create  
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conditions that are conducive for civil war onset.  
 
 Finally, a county might intervene in the target state to protect diplomatic or military  
 
interest, such as military bases, embassies, or diplomats.
199
  In rare circumstances, though it has  
 
occurred, a government may relocate bases into the country that the government is planning on  
 
invading so as to use the protection of the base as an excuse for invading.
200
  It is more common,  
 
however, for a government to invade a country in an effort to protect military bases that were  
 
already physically present in the target country.  
 
 
Consequences of Foreign Military Interventions 
 
 The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, ushered in a new basis for the modern  
 
international system of independent states.  Under the treaty, the principle of sovereignty of  
 
nation-states was recognized, in addition to the agreement of non-intervention of one state in the  
 
internal affairs of other state.
201
  Despite this fundamental agreement among the international  
 
community, however, foreign intervention has become quite prevalent in the Post-WWII world.  
 
The second strand of scholarship in this chapter discusses the general consequences that  
 
foreign military intervention has on the target state. Surprisingly, there has been little work done  
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on the impact that foreign interventions have on the countries that are intervened.  Consequently,  
 
the field of international affairs has little understanding of the impacts that military interventions  
 
can have on the target states.
202
   
 
Concluding the section will include the justification as to why certain types of  
 
international military interventions matter more than others.  For example, some types of  
 
interventions, such as those that aim to take sides in a domestic dispute or acquire territory of the  
 
target country, have negative consequences on the target country.  Meanwhile, other types of  
 
interventions, namely those that are conducted for humanitarian purposes, generally have a  
 
neutral effect on the target country.   
 
 Pickering and Kisangani collected data on military ventures for 106 underdeveloped  
 
countries from 1960 to 2002 and found that large scale military interventions do not have a  
 
significant impact on governing institutions, the target state‟s economy, or the target citizens‟  
 
physical quality of life.  Contrarily, hostile interventions into non-democratic states can decrease  
 




 The reason why there is so much difficulty in determining what, if any, consequences are  
 
by intervening into a sovereign state is twofold.  First, there is a tremendous number of factors  
 
that need to be considered in order to predict the consequences, such as: the purpose of the  
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intervention, whether the intervener was a rival or friend of the target state, the amount of troops  
 
dispatched, the types of weapons, if any, that are used, the duration of the intervention, and the  
 
conditions of the targeting country.  There are several other factors that must be considered; the  
 
ones listed are simply those that are fundamental to determining the extent of the consequences  
 
of the intervention.  
 
The second reason why it is difficult to determine the consequences is because  
 
“intervention” cannot be generalized since every foreign military intervention is unique.   
 
Determining the consequences of an intervention must be analyzed on a case by case basis, given  
 
the uniqueness of every intervention.  For example, there is no country that has the same ethnic  
 
fractionalization, GDP, or population size as another.  Therefore, it would not be possible to  
 
explain the consequence that every intervention will have on a target state since no two are  
 
exactly alike.   
 
 What can be determined, however, is whether external interveners intend to spark civil  
 
conflict by intervening in the target state. Generally, if civil war should follow an intervention, it  
 
is an unintended consequence of the interveners.  Although the intervening country may create  
 
conditions that are conducive to civil war onset, it is unlikely that it is intentional.   
 
Depending on the purpose of the intervention, citizens may welcome, be neutral, or  
 
may resist the intervention.  How the central government and target state‟s citizens‟ react to the  
 






For example, if a country intervenes for the strategic purpose of democratizing the target state,  
 
and provides foreign aid and military assistance that keeps the target county‟s government in  
 
power, there is a low probability that internal conflict will occur.
204
  By contrast, if a neighboring  
 
state takes advantage of the target state‟s weak government or military, and intervenes with the  
 




   
 
In the former scenario, the citizens‟ of the target state would likely benefit from the  
 
excess of foreign aid given by the intervener.  Thus, such interventions would likely be  
 
welcomed and the intervener should not expect resistance. However, in the latter scenario, it is  
 
unlikely that the citizens in the target country would welcome such intervention given that their  
 
land is being taken from them by a foreign presence.  Thus, internal conflict would be expected.   
 
 The reason why some international military interventions matter more than others is  
 
attributed to the consequences that are expected to follow.
206
  For example, if the unintended  
 
consequence of internal conflict within the target country ensues the intervention, then the  
 




  If a government had knowledge of such consequences prior to conducting the  
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intervention, the intervener may have decided against it, given the hindrance of genocide on a  
 
systemic level.   
 
 International military interventions may be direct and hostile in nature, or they may be a  
 
more indirect and mild in their methods.
208
  Hostile interventions may reduce the target regime‟s  
 




  Consequently, safe haven possibilities may arise for neighboring  
 
rival groups and facilitate the transnational spread of arms and other illicit activities that increase  
 




 By contrast, supportive interventions, such as those for humanitarian purposes, are likely  
 
to bolster the coercive capacity and enhance the military capacity of the regime.
211
  In turn, the  
 
balance of power will shift in favor of the target leadership over key rival groups.  Interventions  
 




 Because of the instability that already exists within the target state, such  
 
interventions have a neutral effect on the target state.   
 
 An international military intervention does not always precipitate negative consequences;  
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rather, it may actually prevent a war from occurring.  An intervention for the purpose of taking  
 
sides in a domestic dispute could be used as leverage to bolster a particular party‟s position,  
 
which would force the weaker side to hold out in a prolonged struggle.
213
 In turn, the weaker side  
 
would likely surrender, given that the adversary has foreign reinforcement at its avail should the  
 
conflict escalate.  
 
 Knowing the particular type of intervention could assist government leaders in being able  
 
to predict the consequences of the intervention, regardless of whether it will have a positive or  
 
negative effect on the target state. Therefore, categorizing the types of interventions, as opposed  
 
to simply generalizing all types as “intervention,” could be useful by avoiding unfavorable  
 
consequences.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL INTUITION  
 
 While the previous chapter discussed the causes of civil war, this chapter discusses  
 
explanations for the causes of civil war theoretically. To do that, political scientists have  
 
proposed three theories to help explain why civil wars occur: the primordialist view of civil  
 
conflict, the rationalist explanation, and the relative deprivation theory.   
  
The latter two are aligned with the greed vs. grievance theories discussed briefly in the  
 
previous chapter.  The primordialist view is introduced in this chapter and the rationalist and  
 
relative deprivation theories are expounded on because all the three competing theories are the  
 
underlying theme of civil war. 
 
 The primordialist view focuses on explaining ethnic civil war, whereby ethnicity is an  
 
exceptionally strong affiliation that is rooted in old sources of enmity and memories of past  
 
atrocities that make violence difficult to avoid.
214
  Within an ethnic group, people identify with  
 




  Being a part of an ethnic group satisfies an individual primal need to belong to a  
group in an anarchic “Hobbesian” world.
216
   
Furthermore, primordialist argue that the deep and long standing differences between  
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ethnic groups causes conflicts in societies that are ethnically diverse.
217
  Because of the deep  
 
cultural, biological and psychological nature of ethnic cleavages, conflict is rooted in intense  
 
emotional reactions and feelings of mutual threat.
218
  Therefore, when an ethnic groups is  
 
threatened in any way or an event occurs that sparks resemblance of a negative historical event,  
 
the ethnic group will resort to violence.  
 
 There are two stands of thought within the rationalist explanation for causes of civil war.   
 
The first is analogous to the “greed” argument presented by Collier and Hoeffler, whereby rebels  
 
are modeled as rent-seeking entrepreneurs who are driven more by greed than as victims of  
 
either discrimination or victims of a repressive state.
219
  The second strand is offered by Fearon  
 




 The rational explanation of civil war emphasizes the economic motivations for conflict,  
 
void of any psychological or sociological factors.  Their economic model assumes that potential  
 






However, rather than the recruits themselves making the decision to join the rebellion,  
 
many rebel armies use coercion in their recruitment process.
222
  Threats and punishments can be  
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used as selective incentives, whereby it is rational for the rebel leader to use force rather than  
 
reward to solve the lack of membership problem.
223
  Such incentives include wages,  
 






 The second strand of rationalist explanations is expounded on by Fearon and Laitin.   
 
They posit that civil war is likely to occur in states with conditions conducive to rebel  
 
organization, such as economic growth, low income per capita, or mountainous terrain.
225
  These  
 
conditions will either decrease the rebellion‟s opportunity cost or decrease the capacity of the  
 
state, which will result in the mobilization of an insurgent movement.   
 
 Fearon suggests three mechanisms which are compatible with rationalist explanations for  
 
civil war.  All three are directed towards bargaining failure that results in civil war.  Firstly,  
 
asymmetric information regarding the strength of the rebellion results in opponents not knowing  
 
their relative military capability.
226
  For example, if one party is overly optimistic of the chances  
 




  Therefore, either side may believe to be stronger than the other due to asymmetric  
 
information, and has no reason to refrain from engaging in violence.     
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The second reason for bargaining failure is attributed to the inability of states to arrange a  
 
settlement due to commitment problems.  Mutually preferable bargains are unattainable because  
 
one or more states would have an incentive to renege on the terms.
228
  In other words, neither  
 
side is able to come to an agreement to prevent war because the government is likely to renege  
 
on the settlement in the aftermath of the war.   Therefore, a settlement is not attainable given the  
 
inability for either side to fully commit to the terms set forth during negotiations.   
 
 The third rationalist explanation offered by Fearon is less compelling than the first two,  
 
but is still a possible explanation as to why civil war occurs.  States might be unable to attain a  
 
peaceful settlement that both parties agree on due to issue indivisibilities.
229
  Thus, there are  
 
some issues that are so important to either side that compromise is not feasible.  Some examples  
 
include places of special religious or cultural significance, or whether abortion should be both  
 




 Finally, relative deprivation theories argue that civil wars occur when a particular group  
 
within the state becomes sufficiently aggrieved and begin mobilizing for political change. This  
 
argument is aligned with the grievance-based theories discussed in the previous chapter.   
 
Because of the inequality between either the state and its citizens or between citizens  
 
within the state, persons begin rebelling due to frustration.
231
   Frustration does not necessarily  
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lead to violence, but when it is prolonged and sharply felt, anger results and civil war eventually  
 
breaks out.  Just as frustration produces aggressive behavior on the part of the individual, relative  
 




 Relative deprivation does not only include income inequality, but also social conditions  
 
such as political rights or civil liberties.  Feelings of relative deprivation arise when desires  
 
become legitimate expectations, yet the desires are blocked by society.   
 
Many scholars have extended Gurr‟s work by focusing on the roles of democratic and  
 
authoritarian regimes in providing adequate social conditions by which citizens are able to  
 
express discontent peacefully. Hegre, in particular, argues that lack of political rights is a strong  
 
factor for the onset of civil war.
233
  Since there has been an increase in political rights granted to  
 
citizens in the last two centuries, those citizens whom are still deprived of political rights may  
 
begin to grow frustrated. As this sense of unfairness and frustration spreads among communities,  
 
persons begin to collectively rebel.  
 
 An assertion in the relative deprivation theory is that social and temporal comparisons are  
 
an essential component in assessing whether one is deprived.  Both of these comparisons can be  
 
subsumed within the process of counterfactual comparisons between an individual‟s current  
 
outcomes and the outcomes that might have been.
234
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Counterfactual comparisons involve mental simulations, wherein individuals imagine  
 
what their outcome might have been if circumstances had been different.
235
  Once individuals  
 
begin sharing their feelings or imagery thoughts to others, collective actions beings and those  
 
that feel deprived seek what they are deprived of through violent means.  
 
 Given that I am analyzing the relationship between foreign military intervention and civil  
 
war onset, it is doubtful that primordialist theory will be able to explain why civil war occurs.  
 
With the exception of the interventions that occur for the purposes of protecting social factions  
 
or minorities, none of the other eight types of interventions would create conditions causing civil  
 
war that can be explained by common heritage or ethnic group identity.   
 
In other words, if civil war onset could be explained by the primordialist theory, that  
 
would indicate that foreign military interventions have no effect on the target country in terms of  
 
creating civil conflict, given that it would be inevitable due to the deep rooted ethnic ties.  
 
However, as the data has shown and is discussed in chapter 5, income inequality and regime type  
 
do seem to be factors that are conducive to civil war onset.   
   
 The rationalist explanation appears to be the most applicable theory for the cause of civil  
 
war, particularly Collier and Hoeffler‟s economic model.  For example, countries with a higher  
 
GDP such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco did not experience civil war; whereas countries  
                                                                                                                                                             
234
 James M. Olson and Neal J. Roese, “Relative Deprivation and Counterfactual Thinking.” Chapter 12 in Relative 
Deprivation: Specification, Development, and integration.” Eds. Iain Walker and Heather J. Smith. Cambridge 
University Press (2002), 265-66.  
235





with a lower GDP such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen experienced several civil wars between  
 
the years 1980 and 2000.    
 
Additionally, Fearon and Laitin‟s rationalist explanation could also shed light on why  
 
civil war occurs.  For example, there was economic growth in Lebanon from 1990 to 2000, while  
 
the last civil war that occurred after 1980 was in 1989.  Perhaps it was economic growth that  
 
prevented civil wars from occurring.  As a consequence of economic growth, rebels do not have  
 
as much opportunity costs as they would if there was a lower GDP with high inequality.   
 
 Finally, it is unlikely that the reason civil wars occur can be explained by the theory of  
 
relative deprivation.  Although several of the civil wars that occurred in the sample size within  
 
this study did have a Political Terror value of “4” or “5” (elaborated on in chapter 5), there were  
 
several other instances where the Political Terror value was at “5,” yet no civil war occurred.   
 
It is true that political repression does contribute to the likelihood of civil; however, the  
 
data in this study does not reflect it being a sole reason why civil war would occur because the  
 
R-Squared is only .04 when only civil war onset and political terror are regressed.  
 
 Furthermore, a country with a higher GDP is likely have more resources to contribute to  
 
its citizens through assistance programs; therefore, economic inequality would not likely be  
 







CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
 This chapter discusses the methodology of this thesis.  First, the unit of analysis is  
 
discussed and justified.  Next, I provide a description of the data sets that are used, in addition to  
 
justifications for using them.  I also list my hypotheses regarding the connection between the  
 
independent or control variables and the dependent variable.  Finally, I provide a detailed  
 
explanation of the formal quantitative method that I used to test the variables‟ relationships.   
 
 
Unit of analysis 
 
 The unit of analysis consists of countries, all of which are in the Middle Eastern and  
 
North African regions.  My sample consists of the following 20 countries located in the Middle  
 
East and North Africa: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,  
 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab  
 
Emirates, and Yemen.   
 
 I did not include countries that border the Caspian Sea, namely Azerbaiijan,  
 
Turkmanistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Tajiikistan, because there is, arguably, Russian presence  
 
that I did not want to account for in this study.  Russian presence would have to be controlled for  
 
given that the decisions in each respective country‟s government is not entirely its own.  Given  
 






omitted from this study.  Iran is the only country that does border the Caspian Sea, but I included  
 
it in the sample because it shares a border with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; therefore, it is  
 
presumed that internal events could affect surrounding countries.   
 
 Data were collected for each country from 1980 to 2000.  I begin my data analysis in the  
 
year 1980 because that is the year following three major events occurred in the Middle East, all  
 
of which occurred in 1979: the Islamic Revolution erupted in Iran, consequently overthrowing  
 
the Shah and establishing the Islamic Republic, which is still intact today.  In the second event,  
 
the Russian army invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979 in an effort to maintain the power of  
 
the Amin government.  Both the first and second events are used as case studies and are,  
 
therefore, explored in detail in Chapter six.  
 
 Finally, Saddam Hussein formally came to power in Iraq 1979, which reinstated the  
 
power of the Sunni Muslims and eventually worsened the tension between Sunnis and Shiites.   
 
I selected the year 2000 as the last year I collected data was because I did not want to include  
 
data that may be affected by the 2001 U.S. invasion into Afghanistan or the 2003 U.S. invasion  
 
into Iraq.  The presence of the U.S. affected the Polity score of both Afghanistan and Iraq, in  
 
addition to causing a decline in the economies.  Therefore, accounting for these changes in only  
 
two of the 20 countries I analyzed would have created inconsistences within the overall results.   
 
There are several reasons why I selected the Middle East/North Africans region for this  
 






it is an excellent starting point for researchers who seek to analyze political conflict, or in this  
 
case, civil war onset.  For example, it is host to the sixty-seven-year-old Israeli-Palestinian  
 
conflict, which is one of the most enduring conflict to have ever occurred.
236
   
 




  Another example is the interstate war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988,  
 
which destabilized the region for nearly a decade and resulted in devastation for both country  
 
participants.   
 
 The region is also near other long-term conflict zones, including the Horn of Africa, the  
 
Caucasus, and the Sudan.  Because of the internal and regional instabilities, close ties between  
 
the Middle Eastern and arms-producing governments.  Thus, only encouraging the conflict  
 
within the region.  
 
Perhaps this is why there are so many foreign military interventions by countries within  
 
the Middle East.  See table 2 for the quantity of interventions by regions.  When unstable  
 
countries dispatch troops to pursue military goals, the target country is generally in the same  
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   Table 2. Interventions by Region, 1946-2000 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
            Cold War (N=690)      Pre-Cold War (N=425) 
  1946-1989            1990-2005 
    ________________________________            __________________________ 
Region Number Percent Per Year        Number Percent Per Year 
Middle East 173 25.1 3.43 48 11.3 3.00 
Asia 118 17.1 2.68 52 12.2 3.25 
Western Europe 96 13.9 2.18 76 17.9 4.75 
Sub-Sahara Africa 84 12.2 1.90 52 12.2 3.25 
North America 74 10.7 1.68 40 9.4 2.50 
Latin America 45 6.5 1.02 24 5.6 1.50 
Eastern Europe  37 5.4 .84 32 7.5 2.00 



















As shown, the majority of military interventions that occurred before the end of the Cold  
 
War did so in the Middle East.  Although that number drops to 48 after the Cold War, it is still  
 
a substantial number of interventions.  Perhaps the number decreased because of the Gulf War or  
 
the U.S. invasions into Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003.   
 
Aside from the altruistic purposes of intervention, the Middle East/North African region  
 
is attractive to foreigners who seek power.  Because of the quantity of interventions that occurred  
 
in the Middle East and North Africa, in addition to the various purposes of these interventions,  
 
this region is ideal for this research.  
  
Second, because of the continuous conflict in the region, first world countries, either  
 
independently or through the United Nations, have spent decades sending troops that attempt to  
 
calm down the contentious areas and protect civilians.   
 
Third, the Middle East lags behind in economic, social, and political development.
239
   
 
Thus, this stagnation could be reason why there is so much conflict in the region.  It would be  
 
exceedingly unproductive for researchers to use first-world countries, which have experienced  
 
either very little or no civil wars at all, as their samples for studying causes of internal conflict.   
 
Additionally, the Middle East is characterized by authoritarian regimes, oil-dependent  
 
economies, and ethnic diversity, all of which have been linked to causes of civil war.
240
   
  
 Finally, all of the countries in the sample are dominated by Islam, which encompasses the  
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continuous contention between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims.  There are several scholars who  
 
are either advocates or opponents of the theory that ethnic, religious, and linguistic  
 
fractionalization are conducive to civil war onset.  Because the Middle East and North Africa are  
 




 This thesis tests nine independent variables, seven control variables, and consists of one  
 
binary dependent variable.  The nine independent variables all derive from the International  
 
Military Intervention (IMI) data set and are the types of intervention.  Although the interventions  
 




Thus, the nine types of interventions are: (1) take sides in a domestic dispute; (2) attempt  
 
to affect domestic policies; (3) protect a socio-ethnic faction or minority of the target country; (4)  
 
pursue a rebel terrorist forces across the border; (5) attempting to protect economic or resource  
 
interests of self or others; (6) strategic intervention with the goal of stability, regional power  
 
balances, or pursuing ideological goals; (7) humanitarian purposes with the goal of saving  
 
civilians; (8) attempt to acquire or retain territory; and, (9) protect military property or  
 
diplomatic interests.   
 
Following the order above, I have coded these nine independent variables as follows:  
 






these variables were discussed in detail in chapter two.  All nine independent variables are used  
 
as dummy variables, with “0” indicating a foreign military intervention had not occurred, and  
 
“1” indicating that the specific country did experience a foreign military intervention.  
 
When creating my dataset, I listed each of the twenty countries in column A, and listed  
 
each year from 1980 to 2000 in column B for each country.  Columns C-K represents the nine  
 
types of interventions, in which each year for each country has either a “0” or a “1.”  
  
The IMI data set covers the period from 1946 to 2005, by which I am only collecting data  
 
for the years 1980 to 2000.  The data set includes 667 cases of military interventions that have  
 
occurred across international boundaries by regular armed forces of independent states in the  
 
regions of Europe, the Americas (including the Caribbean), Asia and the Pacific, Sub-Saharan  
 
Africa, and the Middle East/North Africa.
241
   
 
Note that data for the years 1946 to 1988 were first collected by Fredrick Pearson and  
 
Robert Baumann (1993).  Data from the years 1989 to 2005 were collected by Emizet F.  
 
Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering (2008).  The update of the IMI data set extended from the  
 
original data set from 1988 and to ensure consistency across the entire 1946 to 2005 time span,  
 
all coding and operationalizations are the same.
242
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 The researchers have defined military intervention operationally as “the movement of  
 
regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country into the territory or  
 
territorial waters of another country, or forceful military action by troops already stationed by  
 
one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute.”
243
  Transport of  
 




   
 
 The data include forceful interventions, which refers to the use of troops  
 
in some form of deterrent or forceful role; the interventions are not referring to troops reinstating  
 
infrastructure or acting as administers for medical relief programs, even if the latter may  
 
influence the course of battle.
245
   
 
 Overall, the IMI data set catalogs any purposeful dispatch of national troops into another  
 




  The reason that I used this data set, as opposed to others that consist of foreign  
 
military interventions, is because it categorizes the motives behind the state uses of military  
 
force.  This data set is one of very few intrastate conflict data sets that have attempted to do so.
247
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The researchers have used dummy variables that indicate whether troops were dispatched to  
 
pursue the motive for each of the nine types of intervention.   
  
 Because of the increase in the occurrence of civil wars since the end of WWII, it is  
 
becoming increasingly important to study intrastate conflict.  There is already ample literature  
 
discussing the causes of civil wars; however, there is little literature on the motivations of  
 
countries to intervene.  These data, paired with the Correlates of War data set (hereafter COW),  
 
could assist researchers in determining whether a specific motivation of intervention would  
 
facilitate civil war in the target country.   
 
Kisangani and Pickering (2009) acknowledged this use when they stated: “Researchers  
 
can focus on specific types of motivating issues to add new knowledge to our understanding of  
 
forceful state activity, or they can group them into broader categories similar to Regan‟s (2002)  
 




  Next, I turn to the control variables.  Each will be discussed separately, as there are  
 
different data sets that must be described in detail.  The first control variable is “gross domestic  
 
product” (GDP).  As it defined by the World Bank, GDP is the sum of gross value added by all  
 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included  
 




As explained in the literature review, countries experiencing economic inequality  
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(relative to other countries, not individuals) and poverty have been argued to be causes of civil  
 
war.  Collier and Hoeffler are among those who vehemently argue that factors that increase the  
 
domestic military or financial viability of rebellion correlate with conflict; more so than factors  
 
leading to grievances such as lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious fractionalization.
250
   
 
 In regards to the data, all monetary figures are in U.S. dollars and were converted from  
 
domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates.  The following data were missing  
 
from the World Bank data set: Afghanistan: 1982 to 2000; Iraq: 1980 to 2000; Iran: 1991 and  
 
1992; Lebanon: 1980 to 1987; Libya: 1980 to 1989; and, Yemen: 1980 to 1989.   
 
Therefore, for purposes of completeness, I gathered all data that was missing from the  
 
Statistical Division from the United Nations.  The United Nations also converted the current and  
 
constant price series into U.S. Dollars by applying the corresponding market exchange rates as  
 
reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  It is highly doubtful that the exchange rate  
 
reported to the IMF would skew the GDP figure.
251
     
 
 Since STATA converts the GDP figures into scientific notation, it may be difficult to  
 
interpret the logit regression results.  Therefore, I divided each GDP figure by one million.   
 
Consequently, the place values for the decimal numbers are represented in the tens, ones, and  
 
tenths places.  These place values are translated into trillion, billion, and million, respectively.  
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 The data for the second and third control variables, Polity and Democratic scores, were  
 
derived from the Polity IV data set.  Polity IV consists of data on political regime characteristics  
 
and transitions that have been collected from the year 1800 to 2013.
252
  The data set itself is an  
 
annual, cross-national time-series and polity-case format that codes democratic and autocratic  
 






 The Polity Score captures a country‟s regime authority, which is referring to qualities  
 
of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions. The term “Polity” itself is  
 








  To obtain the Polity score, the researchers subtracted the “autocratic” score from  
 
the “democratic” score.     
 
 Afghanistan is the only country that is missing both Polity and Democratic scores; the  
 
years missing are: 1980 to 1988 and 1993 to 1995.  Scores are missing for 1980 to 1988 because  
 
the government was interrupted from a foreign presence.
256
  Scores are missing from the years  
 
1993 to 1995 because there was no government; the country was in anarchy.
257
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 The “Democratic” score was obtained by analyzing three different elements: first, “the  
 
presence of the institutions and procedures though which citizens can express effective  
 
preferences about alternative policies and leaders.”
258
  Second, the existence and extent of  
 
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive.
259
 Finally, the civil  
 
liberties guaranteed by the government in addition to acts of political participation.  Means of  
 
these democratic principles also include the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, and  
 
freedom of the press. The “Democratic” score ranges from zero to ten; the closer the score is to  
 
zero, the less democratic a country is.  
 
 The purpose of testing these two control variables is to determine whether regime type  
 
effects civil war onset. The majority of scholars who are mentioned in the literature review have  
 
either been advocates or opponents of the hypothesis that the more autocratic a government is,  
 
the more prone that country is to civil war.  It will be interesting to determine whether, and to  
 
what extent, this argument has any merit.  Additionally, it will be interesting to know whether  
 
there is any association between how democratic a county is affects the likelihood of civil war.  
  
The ethnic fractionalization data compiled by Alberto Alesina (2003) and associates will  
 
be used for the fourth, fifth, and sixth control variables.  The data set measures the degree of  
 
ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in various countries.  It also takes into account  
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racial characteristics (ethnicity) while examining the effects of ethnic fragmentation on both  
 
economic growth and the quality of institutions and policy.
260




Alesina, et al. gathered their data from Encyclopaedia Britannica, CIA‟s World Factbook,  
 
Levinson‟s Ethnic Groups Worldwide, Minority Rights Groups International‟s World Directory  
 
of Minorities,  and Mozaffar & Scarrit.
261
 A score of “1” implies a highly heterogeneous country;  
 




The only problem with using Alesina‟s data is that it is not a time series data set.  Rather,  
 
the data set is cross-sectional, whereby the ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization  
 
scores are given for one specific year per country.   
 
The only country that was missing ethnicity data was Yemen, and I supplemented the  
 
missing score with Fearon‟s fractionalization data.  I did so because he also included data on  
 
linguistic and religious fractionalization per country.   There were two other data set that I found  
 
which used a time series for each of the three fractionalization scores; however, the data set  
 
lacked both reliability and validity because the researchers only relied on the CIA‟s World  
 
Factbook to obtain the data.  This is problematic because relying on one source, without  
 
comparing results to other sources, may yield inaccurate results.  Therefore, Alesina‟s  
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fractionalization data is the most credible of the three.   
 
To account for the missing data for nineteen of the years (as only one was reported by  
 
Alesina), I replicated each of the three fractionalization scores for all twenty years.  For example,  
 
in 1995 Afghanistan had an ethnic fractionalization score of 0.7693, a linguistic fractionalization  
 
score of 0.6141, and a religious fractionalization score of 0.2717.   
 
Therefore, for all of the years between 1980 to 1994, and 1996 to 2000, I used these  
 
same scores.  It is unlikely that a country‟s fractionalization would alter substantially; therefore,  
 
this method is justified.  Appendix C is of a chart that reflects each of the three fractionalization  
 
scores that Alesina entered for the actual year, per country.   
 
 The reason I control for ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization is because  
 
fractionalization in general, being a potential cause of civil war, is perhaps one of the most  
 
contentious arguments within the literature.  The empirical research conducted by Fearon and  
 
Laitin  (2003) have demonstrated that there is no relationship between ethnic fractionalization  
 
and civil war onset.
263
  Meanwhile other scholars have reported empirical results that are  
 
favorable to the argument of fractionalization being a strong indicator of civil war onset.
264
   
  
 I am also using the Political Terror Scale (PTS) to measure political repression, the  
 
seventh control variable.  The scale ranges from 1 to 5; “1” indicates no political repression and  
 
“5” indicates severe political repression whereby no citizens have the right to promote  
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The following is a detailed breakdown of the description for each score: a score of “1”  
 
reflects countries that are under a secure rule of law, whereby citizens are neither imprisoned for  
 
their ideological views nor tortured for any purposes.
266
  A “2” reflects a limited amount of  
 
imprisonment for nonviolent political activity in addition to few citizens being tortured or beaten  
 
under exceptional circumstances.  
  
A score of “3” indicates extensive political imprisonment whereby citizens or political  
 
participants are executed.  Additionally, government officials detain persons without trial.  With  
 
a score of “4,” a country‟s civil and political rights violations have expanded to a large number  
 
of the population; murders, disappearances, and torture are common.  Finally, a score of “5”  
 
reflects terror that has expanded to the whole population and leaders place no limits on the means  
 




The reason I am testing both Polity IV and PTS is because Polity IV not only measures  
 
how democratic a country is, but it also measures regime type.  PTS, however, measures  
 
repression in the context of political and civil rights violations.  
 
Data for the PTS were collected by data from the Amnesty International and the State  
 
Department.  However, I rely on score reported by the State Department since is provides more  
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data than Amnesty International collected.  Fortunately, the researchers created the data set as a  
 
time-series.  The following are missing data from the PTS: Lebanon, from year 1980 to 1988;  
 
Yemen, years 1985, 1986, and 1988.  The researchers who gathered the PTS data did not indicate  
 
why data were missing from Lebanon and Yemen for those particular years stated above.    
  
The dependent variable is civil war, and I use the COW Intra-state War data set (2014).   
 
Because of the detailed description of the operationalization of civil war that was given in  
 
Chapter Two, I will not elaborate on criteria for determining an armed conflict is a civil war.   
 
Similarly, because of the numerous variables involved in this data set, I will only elaborate on  
 
the variables that are used in this study.   
 
Generally, the COW Project is an academic study of the history of warfare and was  
 
founded by David Singer, a political scientist at the University of Michigan.  The project is  
 
currently in its fourth version, which includes data collected from 1816 to 2010, constituting a  
 
total of 334 intra-state wars.  Although the COW Project has multiple data sets, only the  
 
Intrastate War data set is used in this thesis.   “Intrastate war” is defined as a war that  
 
predominately takes place within the recognized territory of a state.
268
   
 
 Within the COW typology of war, intra-state wars have been subdivided into three  
 
general types, which are based up on the status of the combatants: (1) civil wars that involve the  
 
government of the state against a non-state entity; (2) regional internal wars that involve the  
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government of a regional subunit against a non-state entity; and, (3) inter-communal wars that  
 
involve combat between two or more non-state entities within the state.
269
  Civil wars are then  
 
subdivided further into two types: those attempting to take control of the central government, and  
 




 It is important to note that intra-state wars are classified as “internationalized” when one  
 
or more outside state intervenes in the war.  The war will remain “internationalized” as long as  
 
the intervenor does not participate in the bulk of the fighting.
271
  If the intervenor does take over  
 
the bulk of the fighting, then the war will cease to be labeled as an intra-state war and it will,  
 
thus, be transformed into a different classification.  This is an important detail for this study,  
 
since the focus is not only on intrastate wars, but also foreign military intervention.  Similar to  
 
the coding of the IMI data, the variable “civil war” is also a dummy, whereby “0” indicated no  
 
civil war occurred and “1” indicating that one had occurred.  
 
 Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics and variable type for all 17 variables that are  
 
used in this study.  The purpose of the table is to compare the variables with one another in an  
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 Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables. 
Variable 
 
N Min. Max. Mean Median Mode Std.Dev. Type 
Domestic 420 0 1 .012 0 0 .109 Independent / 
Binary 
Policy 420 0 1 .067 0 0 .250 Independent / 
Binary 
Social 420 0 1 .014 0 0 .119 Independent / 
Binary 
Pursuit 420 0 1 .036 0 0 .186 Independent / 
Binary 
Economic 420 0 1 .045 0 0 .208 Independent / 
Binary 
Strategic 420 0 1 .064 0 0 .246 Independent / 
Binary 
Human 420 0 1 .038 0 0 .192 Independent / 
Binary 
Territory 420 0 1 .040 0 0 .197 Independent / 
Binary 
Diplomatic 420 0 1 .029 0 0 .167 Independent / 
Binary 
GDP 420 .137 19.9 3.33 1.80 N/A 3.79 Control / 
Continuous 
Polity 408 -10 10 -5.55 -7 -10 5.58 Control / 
Ordinal 
Democracy 408 0 10 1.12 0 0 2.61 Control / 
Ordinal 
Ethnicfract 420 .039 .792 .460 .493 N/A .236 Control / 
Continuous 
Lingfract 420 .008 .746 .329 .363 N/A .236 Control / 
Continuous 
Religfract 420 .002 .789 .269 .235 N/A .233 Control / 
Continuous 
Politerr 408 1 5 2.91 3 3 1.20 Control / 
Ordinal 












 Overall, I hypothesize that the type of the intervention strongly effects whether civil war  
 
will occur within the intervened state.  Civil war onset is an unintended consequence of the  
 
intervener for those purposes that are directed towards self-interest, as opposed to helping  
 
citizens in the intervened state. Hypotheses one through nine are the key hypotheses; whereas,  
 
hypotheses ten through sixteen are the hypotheses relating to the control variables. Note that the  
 
hypotheses are pertinent to all regression results: the logit regression models accounting for and  
 
omitting the lagged independent variables, in addition to the marginal post-estimations.   
 
 
H1: An intervention for the purpose of resolving a domestic dispute, which is occurring within  
 
the target state, will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil war. 
 
H2: An intervention for the purpose of affecting domestic policies of the target country will  
 
likely increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.  
 
H3: An intervention for the purpose of protecting a socio-ethnic faction or minority will decrease  
 
the likelihood of the onset of civil war.  
 
H4: An intervention for the purpose of pursing rebel terrorist forces across the border will  
 
increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war. 
 
H5: An intervention for the purpose of protecting the economic interests of the intervening  
 
country will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.  
 






likelihood of the onset of civil war. 
 
H7: An intervention for humanitarian purposes will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil  
war. 
 
H8: An intervention for the purpose of acquiring or retaining territory will increase the  
 
likelihood of the onset of civil war. 
 
H9: An intervention for the purpose of protecting military property or diplomatic interests will  
 
increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war. 
 
















H14: High linguistic fractionalization within a country will increase the likelihood of the onset  
 
of civil war. 
 
H15: High religious fractionalization within a country is will increase the likelihood of the onset  
 






H16: High political terror that a government enforces on its citizens will increase the likelihood  
 




 The data in this study are organized with a pooled time series cross sectional analysis,  
 
which consists of the combination of time series and cross-sectional data.  This approach  
 




  In essence, time series (regular temporal observations of a unit of  
 
analysis) are combined with cross-sections (observations on a unit of analysis at a single time) to  
 




 The main advantage with combining cross sections with time series is that the researcher  
 
is able to capture variations across different units in space, as well as variation that emerge over  
 
time when one unit of analysis.
274
  This approach is ideal for this study because I am analyzing  
 
the effect that different types of interventions have on civil war onset.  My data are limited to the  
 
Middle Eastern / North African region; therefore, it is necessary to include the comparative  
 
component.  Also, time series analysis is essential since I am analyzing the effect that an  
 
intervention has on the target country, namely, civil war onset.   
 
For example, if a country intervenes in another in 1980, I need to record whether a civil  
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war has occurred in any of the years after 1980.  Of course, there must be an endpoint at which  
 
an intervention has an influence on the target country‟s stability, which is why I lagged the  
 
independent variables (discussed in the next chapter). Nevertheless, both comparative data and  
 
time series are necessary to test my variables.  Therefore, I constructed a panel data set; whereby  
 
all string variables (namely the country year) are converted to longitudinal data.     
 
Aside from the advantage of creating a pooled cross sectional time series (PCTS) design  
 
mentioned above, there are three additional advantages to using the PCTS.  First, both time series  
 




  Limiting the number of spatial units and available data over time may violate basic  
 
assumptions of standard statistical regression analysis, namely spatial autocorrelation.
276
   
 
The small sample shows an imbalance between the explanatory variables.
277
  However,  
 
because of the “country-year” observations in pooled PCTS designs, researchers are able to test  
 
the impact of a large number of predictors of the change in the dependent variable within the  
 




Second, pooled PCTS models permit the inquiry into theoretically important variables  
 
that often escape analytical notice within simple cross-sectional or time-series studies. In other  
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words, regression analysis in pooled PCTS data relies upon higher spread of data in respect to  
 
each study independently.  
 
Third, using pooled PCTS allows the researcher to capture the variation of the variables  
 
that emerge through time and space simultaneously.
279
  For example, instead of testing a time  
 
series model for only one country using time series data or testing a cross-section model for  
 
multiple countries at one point in time, the PCTS model allows testing for many countries  
 
through whatever time period the researcher chooses. 
  
 However, despite these advantages, PCTS may encounter several problems.
280
 First,  
 
regression error term tend to not be independent across periods; rather, they might be serially  
 
correlated in that errors in the country data at a specific period of time are correlated with errors  
 
in that that country at a prior time period.
281
  This is connected to the second implication in that  
 
such errors in country i at time t are correlated with errors also in country j at time t.  This  
 
inadvertently may create errors for other countries when, independently, there should be none.  
  
The third complication is regarding heteroskedastic errors, such that the error term  
 
may have differing variances across ranges or subsets of nations.
282
 PCTS models are  
 
particularly vulnerable to those errors because the scale of the predicted dependent variable may  
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differ between countries over different periods of time.  
 
 In the same vein, errors tend to conceal unit and period effects because heteroskedasticity  
 
and auto-correlation are functions of model misspecification (referring to when an independent  
 
variable‟s value is correlated with the error term).
283
  The misspecification, which is problematic  
 
for pooled data, is the assumption of homogeneity of the independent variables across units and  
 
time periods.  Therefore, if researchers assume that the units and time periods are homogeneous,  
 
as the OLS estimation requires, and they are not, then the least squares estimators will be  
 
biased by not accounting for the possibility of heterogeneity existing among the variables.
284
   
 
Consequently, the least square estimators will unlikely be a good predictor of the dependent  
 






 Finally, since the processes linking dependent and independent variables tend to vary  
 
across subsets of nations or periods, errors tend to reflect some varying causal heterogeneity  
 
across space, time, or both.
286
  Similar to the previously discussed complication, misspecification  
 
could occur and the estimated constant-coefficient models will not accurately capture the causal  
 
heterogeneity across time and space.
287
  The next chapter discusses how these complications are  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION  
In this chapter, I will first discuss and justify the regression model that I have specified  
 
and estimated, in addition to a detailed discussion of the results of the regression analysis.  The  
 
analysis section will also address whether any of the hypotheses listed in Chapter Four were  
 
statistically supported.  The second section will discuss the limitations of this study, while the  
 






  The software program that I used to conduct my data analysis was STATA. Not  
 
only am I familiar with STATA, but it is also appropriate to use for analyzing longitudinal data.   
 






 The following is the standard formula for conducting nonlinear regression analysis: y =  
 
f(β, x) + ε.
289




 “β” represents the parameters that are to be estimated, and “X” refer to the  
 
predictor variables, all of which are the independent and controlled variables.  Finally, the “ε”  
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represents the random error, which is assumed to be normally distributed, in addition to being  
 




 The nonlinear regression formula in the context of this study is as follows:  
 
y= civil war (std. error/t-value/pr>| t | · i.domestic i.policy i.social i.pursuit i.economic 
i.strategic i.human i.territory i.diplomatic gdp polity democracy ethnicfract lingfract religfract 
politer) + random error. 
 
 I instructed to STATA that my data set was longitudinal; whereby, the panel is  
 
“country” and the time is “year.”  Doing so was necessary so that STATA would produce results  
 




 Logistic regression is used to model dichotomous dependent variables.  The predicted  
 




   Unlike the coefficients in other regression models, such as Ordinary  
 
Least Squares (OLS) or General Least Squares (GLS), the coefficients in logit do not have  
 
intrinsic substantive interpretation attached to them.
293
  Therefore, the marginal effects for the  
 
binary variables must be calculated using a post-estimation approach to interpret the coefficient.   
 
The marginal effect is an approximation of how much the dependent variable is expected to  
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 Only key marginal effects that are statistically significant will be  
 
discussed following the discussion of the regression analyses.   
 
Because the functional form is non-linear, the interpretations of the individual  
 
coefficients do not have the same linear relationship.  Therefore, to accurately interpret the  
 
model in terms of determining what assertions the independent variables and control variables  
 
may have on the dependent variable, it is imperative to calculate the marginal effect of each  
 
binary variable while other the other variables are held at their means.
295
  Fortunately, STATA  
 
has a command that computes the marginal effects in addition to proving the standard error, z- 
 
score, and p-value for each variable.   
 
 When deciding whether a researcher should use fixed or random effects for the regression  
 
analysis, the selection of a computational model should be based on the expectation about  
 




 It makes theoretical sense to use the fixed-effect model if two conditions are met.   
 




  Second, if the researcher‟s goal is to compute the common effect size for the  
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identified population, and not to generalize to other populations.
298
  In this study, random effects  
 
are used.  
  
By contrast, random effects should be used when the researcher is accumulating data  
 
from a correlation of cases that had been performed by researchers operating independently  
 






 To decide between fixed or random effects, I conducted a Hausman test, whereby if the  
 
test statistic is not statistically significant, then the preferred model is random effects.   
 
Alternatively, if the null hypothesis was significant, then the preferred model is fixed effects.   
 
The Hausman test tests whether the unique errors are correlated with the repressors, whereby the  
 
null hypothesis indicates that they are not.
300
  After performing the Hausman test, the null  
 
hypothesis was not significant; therefore, I used random effects.  
 
 In regards to how the standard errors for the regression coefficients were calculated, I  
 
used the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators (VCE).  Additionally, I used the observed  
 




  The OIM estimator of the VCE is based on asymptotic maximum-likelihood  
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  The VCE obtained in this way is valid if the errors are independent and identically  
 
distributed normal, which in this case they are because the explanatory variables are not  
 
dependent on one another. Although the estimated VCE is known to be reasonably robust to  
 
violations of the normality assumption, at least as long as the distribution is symmetric and  
 
normal-like, it will then produce accurate standard errors.  Clustering is also important since I am  
 
using panel data, and because I had already indicated to STATA that my data is longitudinal  
 
prior to estimating any regressions, STATA automatically accounts for clustering based on a  
 
systematic program tool. 
 
 I estimated two regressions: the first without lagging the independent variables and the  
 
second lagging the independent variables by one year.  The reason I chose to lag the types of  
 
interventions by one year in the second regression is because an international military  
 
intervention may take time to influence the stability of the targeted country.   
 
For example, if country x intervenes in target country y in 1985 (regardless of the type of 
 
intervention), it may be months before the effects of the foreign presence are felt.  Civil war  
 
could break out a year after the intervention has occurred, and it still is linked to the  
 
intervention. Therefore, I lag all independent variables by one year to account for this possibility.   
 
As table 4 indicates, seven of the nine types of military interventions were statistically  
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significant without lagging the independent variables.  In the logit model, the coefficient for  
 
interventions for purposes of taking sides in a domestic dispute has a negative relationship with  
 
civil war onset.  It is also statistically significant.  This is theoretically expected because such  
 
interventions are generally more hostile because it is unlikely that the adverse party will  
 






































Table 4. Logit Regression Analysis of the Onset of Civil Wars 
 
     Model 1             Model 2      
                   (Civil War)                 (Civil War –Lagged Interventions)     
 
Domestic Intervention               -1.14  (11.3)               -1.16  (9.43)         
Policy Intervention                    -7.98  (9.61)                  3.17  (9.12)          
Social Intervention                    -1.51  (15.1)                    2.01  (1.87)  
Pursuit Intervention                     2.91  (1.49)**           -3.16  (3.45)        
Economic Intervention                  .437  (10.2)                  2.16  (.012)         
Strategic Intervention                    4.26  (11.2)                         -5.85  (10.2)         
Humanitarian Intervention            4.89  (16.0)                    -7.02  (1.98)*        
Territorial Intervention                  35.7  (6.48)           -16.3  (9.64)         
Diplomatic / Military                     4.40  (14.9)            2.36  (7.35)          
 Intervention  
GDP                    -.117  (.120)                 -.563  (.279)**     
Polity                     -1.33  (1.01)                    .050  (.324)**      
Democracy                    -.051  (.057)                    -.236  (.869)*      
Ethnic Fractionalization                3.16  (3.09)                                     -.562  (1.93)        
Linguistic Fractionalization         -9.72  (3.10)**                    -2.51  (2.60)        
Religious Fractionalization           4.45  (6.56)                                     -1.71  (2.67)        
Political Terror                    3.73  (1.34)*                                    1.72  (.571)***    
Constant                     -9.05  (5.33)      -7.59  (3.01) 
Pseudo  R
2
                    0.549        0.340 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 













However, when the independent variables are lagged by one year, domestic intervention  
 
is no longer statistically significant and actually is negatively asscoiated with civil war.  Perhaps  
 
it is because tensions among both parties are high when the intervention first occurs, then begins  
 
to dissipate once the intervening presence has been in the target country for a substantial amount  
 
of time.  The null hypothesis is not rejected for the regression model indicating the lagged  
 
variables since domestic intervention is not statistically significant.  However, the null  
 
hypothesis is rejected for the logit regression model.  
 
Intervention for the purposes of affecting the target country‟s policies has a negative  
 
relationship with civil war onset in the logit model. The variable was not statistically significant  
 
It may seem counterintuitive that the likelihood of civil war decreases when a country intervenes  
 
to affect policies; however, perhaps the foreign intervention prevented the target country from  
 
developing a civil war due to the very polices that were affected by the intervening county.    
 
Another reason civil war does not occur may be because governments of the target  
 
country do not know that the motive is such. For example, the IMI data set, understandably, does  
 
not include data on what the target country‟s government may have believed the purpose of  
 
the intervention to have been.  Therefore, the government of the target country could simply be  
 
ignorant of what the real motive was, thus, being more welcoming to the intervention as opposed  
 
to resisting it.     
 






not statistically significant in the logit model.  Also, the relationship with civil war onset is  
 
positive.  Perhaps either government officials or the rebels discovered the intervener‟s policy-  
 
changing motive; as a result, hostilities increased causing civil war to break out.  In contrast to  
 
the domestic intervention hypothesis, the policy intervention null hypothesis is rejected for the  
 
regression model lagging the independent variables.  However, the null hypothesis is not rejected  
 
for the logit regression model. 
 
An intervention for the purpose of social protection produced the expected regression  
 
results: the variable is negatively associated with civil war onset, but it is not statistically  
 
significant in the logit regression model.  It is expected that an intervention for the purpose of  
 
protecting a particular social groups would not spark a civil war because such interventions are  
 
generally non-hostile. Thus, there would be little incentive for rebels to react negatively to the  
 
presence of the intervenors.   
 
 However, when types of interventions are lagged one year, the social intervention  
 
variable is no longer statistically significant, and is positively associated with civil war onset.   
 
When a country intervenes to protect a particular social group (for example, an ethnic group or  
 
minority), civil war does not occur within the same year of the intervention and there is no  
 
statistically significant relationship with civil war onset.  Perhaps one year after the protection,  
 
other groups begin to feel aggrieved because one group is being favored over another.  Over  
 






the interveners or those being protected.  Thus, civil war ensues.  The null hypothesis is rejected  
 
for the regression model without the lagged independent variable.  However, the null hypothesis  
 
is not rejected in the regression model including the lagged variables.   
 
 This finding of the social protection intervention variable as having a positive  
relationship with civil war is at the core of the grievance–based argument that Taydas (2011),  
and Regan and Norton (2005), argued.  Similarly, the finding is in line with Regan and Norton‟s  
 
(2005) argument that ethnic or religious hatred could form grievances that lead to civil war.   
 
Although the social protection intervention variable is not specific to minority or ethnic groups,  
 
such groups are included in the social variable within the IMI‟s data set. The findings here are  
 
contrary to Fearon and Laitin‟s (2003) argument that citizens‟ grievances were not enough to  
 
increase the likelihood of civil war onset.   
 
Intervention for the purpose of pursuing rebel terrorist forces across the border has a  
 
positive relationship with civil war onset and it is highly statistically significant in the logit  
 
regression model.  This can be explained by the fact that foreigners are generally unwelcome  
 
guests in the context of intervening without the permission of the target country‟s government.   
 
Thus, to intervene in a sovereign country to catch rebels who may not even be a threat to the host  
 
country, may cause citizens to resist the interveners and lash out in violence of their presence.   
 
Another possible theoretical explanation is that perhaps the rebels or terrorist groups who 
 
are being chased across the border have connections to citizens of the target country.  Thus,  
 






for reinforcement, which creates a “side-taking” atmosphere whereby rebel supporters begin  
 
arming against non-rebels.  As a result, civil war breaks out.   
  
The pursuit intervention variable is no longer significant in the logit model when the  
 
independent variables are lagged by one year, and the relationship with civil war changes to  
 
negative.  A possible explanation as to why the pursuit intervention variable changes to negative  
 
a year after the intervention may be because the intervening force caught the rebels or terrorist  
 
group(s) before the violation could escalate.   
 
Another possibility is that the mission to pursue the individuals may have been covert;  
 
thus, the intervener captured the target and left the target country before anyone discovered  
 




 Interventions for the purpose of protecting economic or resource interests of the  
 
intervener, as well as interventions protecting military property or diplomatic interests, were  
 
statistically significant in the regression without lagging the variables.  Both economic and  
 
diplomatic intervention variables have a positive relationship with civil war onset.  Although the  
 
relationships remain positive with civil war onset after lagging the independent variables by one  
 
year, the economic and diplomatic variables are no longer statistically significant.   
 
 These results are theoretically sound because a foreigner invading to protect its economic  
 





numbers of citizens living in the target country.  Therefore, when a foreign presence invades for  
 
the purpose of protecting its economic interest, it could, in turn, tarnish the economy and  
 
negatively impact the society as a whole.  This potential harm to the economy may likely  
 
provoke a volatile and immediate response, whereby civil unrest would break out. The null  
 
hypothesis is rejected in the regression model without lagging the independent variables;  
 
however, it is not rejected in the regression model including the lagged variables.     
 
  In the same vein, a country intervening to protect its diplomatic interests or military  
 
property may cause rebels, particularly, to organize and fight for the military equipment.  In  
 
fact, the equipment could have been looted and, when foreign troops enter the country to reclaim  
 
its property, rebels would raise arms to protect it.  Similar to the economic intervention  
 
hypothesis, the null is rejected for the diplomatic intervention hypothesis in the regression model  
 
without the lagged independent variables; however, it is not rejected in the regression model  
 
including the lagged independent variables. 
 
 Strategic intervention with the goal of stability, regional power balances, or pursuing  
 
ideological goals produced the most counter-intuitive results.  The independent variable is highly  
 
statistically significant, and has a negative relationship with civil war onset in both models. This  
 
is surprising given that it was the second-most frequently occurring type of intervention out of  
 
the nine that were tested, as shown in table 5.  Despite there being numerous strategic  
 
















































Table 5. Relative Sum of International Military Interventions  
 
Variable             Mean             Std. Dev. 
 
Domestic Intervention     .012     .109 
Policy Intervention      .067     .250 
Social Intervention     .014     .119 
Pursuit Intervention      .036     .189 
Economic Intervention     .045     .208 
Strategic Intervention     .064     .246 
Humanitarian Intervention    .038     .192 
Territorial Intervention     .040     .197 
Diplomatic / Military Intervention   .029     .167 
______________________________________________________________________________ 



























One explanation for the negative association with civil war could be that the government  
 
of the target country simply did not know that the intervener had the motivation to strategically  
 
sending troops as a means of pursing its ideological goals, similar to the reasoning for the social  
 
policy intervention mentioned above.  Another explanation could be that the intervener only  
 
invaded countries that it knew would create the least resistance or chaos; thus, civil war would  
 
not likely follow the intervention.  For example, if a country seeks to gain regional influence, it  
 
could intervene into a country that it has a good relationship with; therefore, intervening into the  
 
target country would be more accepting of its citizens.  To test these theories, a larger sample  
 
size is needed, which is a limitation in this study and is addressed in the next section.   
  
 The humanitarian intervention coefficient estimate is not statistically significant in the  
 
logit mode.  Contrary to what was expected, the variable has a positive relationship with civil  
 
war onset.  Interestingly, the relationship with civil war onset changes to negative when the types  
 
of interventions are all lagged by one year.  The humanitarian intervention coefficient estimate is  
 
not statistically significant in the regression model including the lagged independent variables.  
 
 Generally, humanitarian missions do not create internal conflict within the target country  
 
because most are seen as peacekeeping missions.
303
 Perhaps, the Middle Eastern / North African  
 
region is unique in this respect, given that the relationship with civil war is positive in the logit  
 
model.  The null hypothesis is not rejected for the logit estimation, but it is rejected when  
 
lagging the independent variables by one year.    
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 The last independent variable to be discussed, intervention for the purpose of attempting  
 
to acquire or retain territory, produced similar results as the humanitarian intervention variable 
 
mentioned above. Territorial intervention is not statistically significant and the data reveal a  
 
positive relationship with civil war onset.  However, lagging the independent variables by one  
 
year changes the relationship with civil war onset from positive to negative.  The null hypothesis  
 
is not rejected for both models given that the variable is not statistically significant.    
 
 A potential reason why there may be a positive relationship in the same year as the  
 
intervention as opposed to a negative one a year later may be because of the occurrence of  
 
military interventions that have occurred by neighboring countries, given the geographic  
 
convenience.  Should the target country be experiencing internal conflict, even at a minimal  
 
level, countries geographically proximate to the target country may take advantage of the target  
 
country‟s vulnerability and intervene for the purpose of acquiring territory belonging to the  
 
target country.   
 
Thus, by an intervenor invading for the purpose of acquiring territory could exploit the  
 
conflict and cause it to intensify.  After the area has either been acquired or the intervener  
 
withdraws a year after the intervention, civil war would be unlikely to break out.  
 
 Next, I turn to the results for the control variables.  Expectedly, the GDP variable has a 
 
negative relationship with civil war onset in both estimations, and is statistically significant only 
 






likelihood of civil war onset decreases.  Therefore, there does seem to be an association between  
 
low GDP and civil war.  The null hypothesis is rejected in the regression model including the  
 
lagged independent variables, but is not rejected in the specification without the lagged the  
 
independent variables.     
 
 The Polity variable is not statistically significant in the first regression model, and it  
 
had a positive relationship with civil war onset.  However, Polity has a negative relationship with  
 
civil war once the independent variables are lagged by one year.  The negative relationship was  
 
expected because it is theoretically sound that the less autocratic a country is, the frequency of  
 
civil war onsets decreases.  This relates back to the grievance arguments: citizens who are  
 
aggrieved by the state will are more likely to rebel against the government.   
 
These results are contrary to what Hegre, et. al (2001) found because it is not  
 
intermediate regimes that are more conducive to civil war onset, but rather autocracies that tend  
 
to be associated with civil war onset.  The null hypothesis is not rejected in the first regression  
 




The democracy variable also had the theoretically expected relationship with civil war  
 
onset in that the more democratic a country is, the liklihood of civil war onset decreases.   
 
Democracy is not statistically significant in either of the estimation models.  These results  
 






relationship with civil war onset. The null hypothesis is not rejected in either regression models,  
 
given that the Democracy variable is not statistically significant.  
 
 I hypothesized that the more ethnically, linguistically, and religiously fractionalized a  
 
country is, the more likely civil war would occur.  The results for ethnic and religious  
 
fractionalization were the same in terms of statistical significance in that the variables were not  
 
statistically significant in either of the regression models. Similarly, ethnic and religious  
 
fractionalization have a positive relationship with civil war onset in the first regression model.   
 
Thus, as the ethnic and religious fractionalization increases within a country, as, too, will the  
 
frequency of civil war onset.   
 
However, the variables change from having a positive relationship to a negative  
 
relationship once the independent variables are lagged by one year.  It is surprising that the more  
 
ethnical and religious fractionalization there is in country, the less likely civil war will occur.   
 
My initial thought was perhaps all of the twenty countries in the sample size were similar in  
 
terms of fractionalization scores, thus having a modicum effect on civil war.  However, table 6  
 
shows, the countries were highly diverse from one another in terms of Alesina‟s (2003)  
 
fractionalization scores. Nevertheless, these are the observed findings.  Therefore, the null  
 










Table 6. Relative Variation between Fractionalization Variables  
 
Variable      Mean         Min        Max 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization    .460   .039    .792 
Linguistic Fractionalization    .329   .008    .746 
Religious Fractionalization    .269   .002    .787 


































 The positive association between religious fractionalization and civil war onset after  
 
lagging the independent variables could be attributed to the fact that the dominant religion in  
 
both the Middle East and North African region is Islam, and there are many different factions  
 
within the religion.  Therefore, citizens may be more likely to have religious hatred for those not  
 
following their faction of religion. For example, Islam is not just a system of faith, but it is a way  
 
of life.  Namely, the Shiites and Sunnis are two religious factions that split in the eighth century  
 
because persons were unable to decide whether it should be a friend to Mohammad or bloodline  
 
to succeed the Prophet Mohammad after his death.
304
   The split has diversified even further  
 
throughout the last two centuries with some factions becoming more Islam fundamentalists while  
 
others more pro-Western. This diversification within the Islam religion could be why a high level  
 
of religious fractionalization has a positive relationship with civil war onset.   
 
By contrast, linguistic fractionalization is statistically significant in the first estimation,  
 
but not statistically significant when the independent variables are lagged by one year.   
 
Linguistic fractionalization has a negative relationship with civil war onset in both regression  
 
models.  Thus, as the linguistic fractionalization increases in a country, the likelihood of civil  
 
war onsets decreases. The null hypothesis is rejected in the first regression model, but is not  
 
rejected in the specification that includes the lagged independent variables.   
 
 Finally, the political terror variable is highly statistically significant and has a positive  
 
relationship with civil war onset in both regression models.  Thus, the more politically repressive  
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a government is, the more likely civil war will occur.  The null hypothesis is rejected in both  
 
regression models. This results are not surprising because the more repressive a government it,  
 
the more citizens will begin to feel aggrieved, and are more likely to rebel against the  
 
government.   
 
Some scholars have argued that the more repressive a country is, the less likely citizens  
 
will rebel due to the strong hold that the government has on its citizens.  However, this may be  
 
true for protests and other minor forms of resistance, but it is not the case for civil war onset, as  
 
the data has shown.   
 
 When accounting for the marginal effects, holding all other independent variables at their  
 
means, the likelihood of a pursuit intervention resulting facilitating civil war onset increases by  
 
8%.  When a diplomatic intervention occurs, the likelihood of civil war goes up to 15%.   
  
 When a strategic intervention occurs, the likelihood of civil war occurring a year after the  
 
intervention increases by 28%.  When a territory intervention occurs, the likelihood of civil war  
 





 This research is limited to 20 countries all within the Middle Eastern and North African  
 
Regions, in which twelve civil wars occurred within the time period that is studied.  Analyzing  
 






not yield enough explanatory power.  Therefore, the study would be strengthened if there were a  
 
larger number of civil wars to analyze.  
 
 Additionally, using a time series data set for the ethnic, linguistic, and religious  
 
fractionalization scores may have produced more finite results for those three control variables.  
 
Although a country‟s ethnic, linguistic, and religious oval makeup does not alter substantially  
 
over a 20 year period, it does vary slightly as citizens are constantly relocating in terms of  
 
immigrating and emigrating, in addition to new citizens being born and other dying on a  
 
daily basis.  Thus, the ethnic composition, particularly, of a country will naturally fluctuate.  It  
 
would be interesting to determine whether, and to what extent, the regression results change if a  
 
time series data set was to replace Alesina‟s fractionalization data that was used.  
 
 A third limitation of this study is the absence of existing literature that there are on topics  
 
such as consequences, and types of foreign military interventions.  Although scholars have  
 
conducted studies regarding the effects that third party interventions have on civil wars, there has  
 
been little work completed on the consequences that military interventions have on the targeted  
 
country.  Granted, it is difficult to generalize the consequences of an intervention, given that each  
 
intervention and target country are indeed unique.  However, it would be advantageous for this  
 
study if there were at least some studies that made an attempt to generalize the consequences that  
 
the interventions have had on the target country. Such studies would provide a more  
 






intervention.  The conditions could then be compared to the different causes of civil war that  
 
scholars have argued in an attempt see if there are any patterns of post-intervention conditions  
 
linking to the causes of civil war.   
 
 There is even less work that has been done on the different types of foreign military  
 
intervention.  It is surprising that scholars have generalized “intervention” where the purposes of  
 
the intervention makes such a large difference in the effect of the target country.  For example,  
 
welcomed interventions are less likely to cause civil unrest, whereas hostile interventions are  
 
more likely to internal violence.  Also, the number of troops makes a difference in the outcome  
 
of the intervention.   
 
Also, it is unlikely that a country sending 500 troops into another for a humanitarian  
 
mission will create chaos in the targeting country.  Contrarily, a country sending 10,000 troops  
 
for a social protection mission is likely to cause resistance of acceptance by the rebels, given not  
 
only the large amount of troops, but also the type of intervention. Because the central theme of  
 
this study is civil war being an unintended consequence of international military intervention,  
 





This thesis not only contributes to the existing literature by examining the relationship  
 
between international military intervention and civil war onset, but it also sets the precedent for  
 





only countries in the Middle East and North Africa, but also other regions, namely Africa.  Civil  
 
war tends to be experienced in underdeveloped countries; thus, Africa would be a fascinating  
 
region to study in the context of foreign intervention and civil war.  Not only does Africa consist  
 
mainly of developing countries, but it has been host to numerous foreign military  
 
interventions and civil wars since WWII.    
 
COW covers the time period from 1816 to 2010, while the IMI data set includes data  
 
from 1946 to 2005, thus, researchers could take on the ambitious tasks of conducting a systemic  
 
study in which all interventions since WWII are regressed with all civil wars post-WWII.  Such a  
 
large sample size could produce more conclusive results that will refine our understanding of the  
 
impact that international military interventions has on civil war onset. Furthermore, additional  
 
control variables could be added to the study, such as whether a country has been formerly  
 
colonized or not.  The IMI data set includes such information for every country, and it would be  
 
useful to know whether a country‟s colonial history has any relationship with civil war onset.   
 
The theoretical expectation is that there is pattern of interventions by a former colonizer in to a  
 
former colony.  However, it would be an interesting study to determine whether the data supports  
 
the theoretical expectation.   
 
Anecdotally, the Middle East and North Africa are all former colonies of the United  
 
Kingdom; however, most great powers have never been colonized.  Thus, colonization may have  
 






intervenes into the country that it once colonized.    
 
For example, Lebanon was invaded by France, a former imperial power, in 1982 for  
 
domestic, social, strategic, and diplomatic purposes.  One year after the intervention, civil war  
 
occurred.  Another example is the 2004 French invasion into the Ivory Coast, also a former  
 
France colony, which led to an outbreak of civil war. Such patterns warrant further investigation.  
  
Another variable to possibly examine is the number of troops; for which the IMI has also  
 
provided data for.  Given that the IMI  has provided data on the number of troops that were sent  
 
for each intervention, it may useful to use this data as a  control variable.  The number of troops  
 
sent into the target country could affect whether civil war will ensure because it could be a  
 
strong determinant of whether citizens of the target state feel threatened by the foreign presence.   
 
It is unlikely that the presence of 100 troops will make the citizens of the target country feel  
 
threatened; however, a presence of 500 may cause citizens to feel threatened, or perhaps  
 
repressed.  Thus, a theoretically understandable reaction would be for the citizens to rise up in  
 
rebellion.    
 
Additionally, it may be interesting to examine how many troops are dispatched generally  
 
for each type of military intervention.  If there is a pattern of similar quantities of troops being  
 
dispatched for each respective type of intervention, then perhaps it is not type of the intervention  
 
that is conduce to civil war onset.  Rather, it may be the amount of troops that intervene into the  
 






CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDIES 
 
 Interestingly, Iran and Afghanistan are both Middle Eastern countries with similar ethnic,  
 
linguistic, and religious fractionalization whereby all citizens are governed by similar repressive  
 
political structure.  Yet, the joint invasion led by the United States and Great Britain in Iran in  
 
1953 did not result in civil war; whereas, the Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 did  
 
result in civil war. In this chapter, I will analogize the two case events and dissect the differences  
 
in an attempt to explain why civil war occurred in Afghanistan but did not occur in Iran.  First, a  
 
brief description of the facts for each case is needed.  
 
 
1953 United States intervention into Iran 
 
The 1953 intervention into Iran, named “Operation TP-AJAX,” was a joint covert  
 
operation whereby the U.S.‟s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Great Britain invaded Iran  
 
with the objective of overthrowing the elected government and, instead, consolidate the power of  
 
the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.
305
   
 
Great Britain had an economic interest in Iran, as they were owners of the Anglo-Iranian  
 
Oil Company.  Prior to the invention, the Iranian government began questioning whether their  
 
government was actually receiving the royalties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that they  
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were due.  Therefore, Prime Minister Mohammd Mosaddegh requested an audit from the British  
 
government, in which the British denied.  As a consequence of the denial, Mosaddegh  
 
nationalized the oil company, requiring an equal share in the oil revenues.   
 
In 1952, the British then embargoed, causing economic tensions in Iran that resulted in  
 
unpopularity for the Iranian Prime Minister. Tehran had failed to find ways of getting alternative  
 






 The royal court began getting frustrated with Mosaddegh‟s attempts to continuously  
 
undermined the monarchy, so the British government announced that the Shah had intended to  
 
leave the country for medical purposes.
307
  The Iranian citizens interpreted, as the British had  
 
intended, that the Shah leaving was a signal of his displeasure with Mosaddegh.  Thus, the public  
 
began to grow increasingly intolerant of the Mosaddegh administration.  
 
Taking advantage of both the unpopularity of Mosaddegh and vulnerability of the  
 
Iranian economy, the British sought help from the United States in overthrowing Prime Minister  
 
Mosaddegh and reinstating the pro-Western Shah, whom did not question the financial activities  
 
of the British.     
 
 This incident had made the U.S. government aware of the opposition groups both within  
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and outside Iran‟s parliament.
308
  It also revealed that there were many citizens still loyal to the  
 
Shah, and encouraged the idea that the Shah would be accepted back into office by the people,  
 
should the U.S. support it.
309
  The U.S. feared that the continuing deteriorating economy would  
 




  Therefore, the CIA coordinated with the British intelligence agency, mi6,  
 
and together they launched a propaganda campaign that evolved into pro-Shah riots, resulting in  
 
the deaths of 800 Iranian citizens.
311
   
 
 The Shah, whom was hiding in Italy at the time the riots occurred, returned to Iran to  
 
reinstate him as the Prime Minister. Given that the economy under the control of Mosaddegh‟s  
 
administration, the former leader was blamed and the citizens favored the reinstatement of the  
 
Shah. Once in power, the embargo was dropped and the economy began growing.  Additionally,  
 
the riots ceased and no further civil violence erupted.  Thus, the coup was successful and the  
 
Shah subsequently ruled as an absolute monarchy for twenty-six years.    
 
 Both Great Britain and the U.S. intervened in Iran for the purpose of affecting domestic  
 
policies.  Great Britain also intervened for the purpose of protecting economic interest. In  
 
addition to seeking to affect domestic policies, the U.S. also intervened for the strategic purpose  
 
of promoting ideological goals. 
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 Both of the great powers intervened in Iran for the purpose of affecting Iran‟s domestic  
 
policies by attempting to manipulate the oil agreement that Great Britain had with Iran.  For  
 
example, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company paid a royalty to the Iranian government for the oil that  
 
was extracted.  The profits of the company, however, were taxed by the British government and  
 




Mosaddegh had nationalized the oil in an effort to avoid the exorbitant taxes.   
 
Reinstating the Shah would reverse Mosaddegh‟s policy, and transactions with the British would  
 
resume.  In fact on the day of his appointment, the new prime minister announced his intention  
 
of resuming business with Great Britain.   
  
Although the United States did not have ownership of the oil company, it was  
 
nonetheless advantaged by having business resume with the British because it, too, would have  
 
oil supplied to it.  Additionally, the Shah was pro-western and anti-communist; therefore, the  
 
U.S. government would have friendly relations with the Iranian government if the Shah, and not  
 
Mosaddegh, were in power.  
 
 Great Britain also intervened in Ian for the purpose of protecting their economic interest.   
 
This is largely because oil exploration generally requires a huge investment, which must be made  
 
prior to producing any profits. Therefore the British had already invested a large amount of  
 






The Iranian government refraining from paying the tax on the oil that was extracted  
 
would undercut the entire petroleum business that the British had invested in.
312
  This is why the  
 
British government initially demanded the continuation of the business, and when Mosaddegh  
 
administration refused, the embargo was placed on Iran. To protect their economic interest, Great  
 
Britain was incentivized to invade and conduct the regime change.   
  
The U.S. intervened in Iran for the strategic purpose of promoting ideological goals  
 
because the government wanted Iran to be pro-western so that the U.S. could remain a major  
 
player in the Middle East.  There has been ample work on U.S. exerting hegemony in the Middle  
 
East; however, reasons beyond the fact that the U.S. has ideological goals that it wants to pursue  
 
exceeds the scope of this thesis.   
 
 The data has shown that interventions that occur for the purpose of strategically pursuing  
 
ideological goals has a negative relationship with civil war onset.  Similarly, interventions  
 
attempting to affect domestic policies of the target state are more likely to  result in civil war  
 
onset a year after the intervention has occurred; whereas, the intervention has a negative  
 
relationship with civil war onset within the first year of the intervention occurring.  Additionally,  
 
interventions for the purpose of protecting economic interests has a negative relationship with  
 
civil war onset.   
 
 In light of the U.S./UK joint intervention into Iran, in addition to what the data has  
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revealed, the observed findings support the association between the types of interventions that  
 
occurred and the absence of civil war onset that followed.  For example, the data showed that  
 
interventions for the purposes of affecting policies of the target state, economic interests of the  
 
intervener, and strategic purposes were all three negatively associated with civil war onset.   
 
These three motivations were the justification for the U.S. and the UK intervention into  
 
Iran.  However, as the data has shown and the facts in the Iranian case study have revealed, civil  
 
war onset did not occur after the intervention.  Thus, the data supports the relationship between  
 
intervention and civil war onset in the Iranian case study.   
 
 However, there are other factors that may mitigate the likelihood of civil war onset,  
 
absent of any association with the foreign military intervention.  For example, the intervention  
 
into Iran was covert, the leader was unfavorable, and the regime change was favored by the  
 
Iranian citizens.  Referring to the first factor, the fact that there were no present military troops  
 
and the riots were staged, the citizens were not alarmed because they were not threatened by an  
 
outside presence.   
 
Also, Mosaddegh‟s administration allowed, or at least it was perceived to have allowed,  
 
the economy to deteriorate.  Consequently, the citizens began affirming the regime change,  
 
especially given that the economy was not in decline when the Shah was in power before  
 
Mosaddegh was elected.  
 






the purpose of the intervention.  The better understanding that researchers have on factors,  
 
conditions, and types of interventions that effect civil war onset, the better they will know how to  
 
prevent it. In the section below, I contrast this case with the 1979 Soviet Union invasion into  
 
Afghanistan, in which civil war did occur following the intervention.   
 
 
1979 Soviet Union intervention into Afghanistan 
 
 The target state in the Soviet intervention did not enjoy the same successful aftereffect as  
 
the target state did in the US/UK invasion.  In 1978, the centrist Afghanistan government was  
 
overthrown by left-wing military officers, who then handed power over to two Marxist-Leninist  
 
political parties, the Khalq and Parcham.
313




Together, these two political parties formed the People‟s Democratic Party of Afghanistan  
 
(PDPA).   
 
The party immediately forged close ties with the Soviet Union, given their similar  
 
socialist policy goals.  Thus, just months after the PDPA rose to power, a friendship treaty was  
 
signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.
315
  Even prior to the official signing of the  
 
treaty, the Soviet Union had been a major influence in terms of policy making in Afghanistan,  
 
notably due to the immense amounts of economic aid, military equipment provided to the PDPA  
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 As a consequence of the PDPA consolidating power, Muslim tribal-based insurgencies,  
 
the mujahideen, began uprising by internally fighting with PDPA supports. The mujahideen were  
 
composed of two alliances: the Peshawar Seven and the Tehran Eight, which were both a multi- 
 
national insurgent group that were funded by the U.S. government to help overthrow the Soviet- 
 
backed regime in power.   
 
In 1979, the PDPA called on the Soviet Union to provide military support and assist in  
 
calming down the unrest.  However, the presence of the Soviets exacerbated a nationalistic  
 
feeling and caused the rebellions to grow in alarming numbers.
317
  Two months after the Soviets  
 
invaded, civil war broke out and lasted until the Soviets withdrew in ten years, claiming the lives  
 
of approximately 1.2 million citizens.  Following several assassinations within the PDPA  
 






The government of President Karmal, a Soviet puppet regime, was utterly ineffective and  
 
the lack of leadership was blamed by Moscow for the problems of Afghanistan.  President  
 
Karmal was not able to consolidate his power, thus stepping down.  In 1986, the former chief of  
 
the Afghan secret police (KHAD) and Soviet-backed Mohammad Najibullah was elected  
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After six years in office, Najibullah‟s government collapsed as a result of the Russian  
 
government withdrawal of forces, thus ending its aid to the Afghan government. One of the  
 
mujahideen rebels, Burhanuddin Rabbani, became the next president in 1992, and was  
 
recognized as such by the United Nations.   
 
 Focusing strictly on the invasion, the Soviets had four objectives when invading  
 
Afghanistan: (1) to ensure that the government of Afghanistan remained friendly to the Soviet  
 
Union; (2) to limit, or if possible exclude, American influence; (3) to limit the effect of  
 






The first objective speaks to the interventions for the purposes of both selecting a side in  
 
a domestic dispute and to affect policies of the target state.  The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to  
 
aid the PDPA against the mujahideen; therefore, they were clearly intervening to take sides in a  
 
domestic dispute. Additionally, the Soviets wanted to remain on good terms with the Afghan  
 
government so that they could influence policy making both during and beyond the conflict   
 
 The second objective is an example of an intervention for the strategic purpose, namely  
 
an effort to maintain regional power by preventing the U.S. from exerting any influence in  
 
Afghanistan.  The third and fourth objectives are also examples of interventions for strategic  
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purposes, but for different reasons than the second objective.   
 
Limiting the effect of fundamental Islamism on the Russian people is an attempt to keep  
 
the region stable; therefore, the purpose of intervening into Afghanistan, for objective three, was  
 
to contain fundamental Islam.  Similarly, the fourth objective is a reason to intervene for the  
 
purpose of strategically attempting to stabilize the Soviet Union by stunting the drug traffic from  
 
entering the intervener‟s country.  
 
 In sum, the civil war that occurred as a result of the 1979 Soviet invasion in Afghanistan  
 
is reflective of what the data revealed.  For example, an intervention for the purpose of taking  
 
sides in a domestic dispute is not only statistically significant, but also has positive association  
 
with civil war onset.  Thus, the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan for the purpose of militarily  
 
supporting the government may have very well been the reason why civil war occurred.   
 
The data also shows that interventions for the purpose of affecting policies of the target  
 
country have a positive relationship with civil war onset once the independent variables are  
 
lagged by one year.  Thus, this, too, could have affected the instability of Afghanistan, which  
 
made civil war inevitable.  Although the Soviet Union also intervened into Afghanistan for  
 
strategic purposes, which has a negative relationship with civil war onset, the strong correlation  
 
that the other two interventions have with civil war onset could have independently caused the  
 
civil war to occur.   
 






Iran.  For example, the Soviet Union intervention was overt because assistance was actually  
 
requested by the PDPA administration.  Also, the centrist government led by Mohammad Daud  
 
Khan, was not necessarily disfavored by the people. In fact, he created a new Afghan  
 
constitution in 1977, improving rights for women, which was widely accepted within the  
 
country.   
 
Finally, unlike the citizens in Iran, the regime-change that ousted Khan and implemented  
 
the PDPA was not favored by the majority of the people, namely the mujahideen.  Perhaps these  
 
factors affect whether an intervention will facilitate civil war onset. Although there are only two  
 
cases discussed, it is nonetheless a starting point to understanding the effect(s) that international  
 


















CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the association between foreign military  
 
intervention and civil war onset, generally, and whether the purpose of the intervention makes a  
 
difference as to whether civil war is likely to follow the intervention, more specifically.   
 
Running two regression models using the logit regression for data that has been collected  
 
for twenty countries in the time period from 1980 to 2000 has produced both expected and  
 
surprising results.  Overall, the data shows that one of the nine types of interventions is  
 
statically significant.   When lagging the independent variables by one year, there is still one type  
 
of interventions that is statistically significant.   Of the control variables, only linguistic  
 
fractionalization and political terror were statistically significant, while GDP, polity, democracy,  
 




 The empirical results show that civil war onset is positively associated with an  
 
intervention for the purpose of pursuing a terrorists or rebel across the target country‟s border. 
 
By contrast, humanitarian intervention is statistically significant and has a negative association  
 
with civil war onset once all independent variables are lagged by one year.   
 
 The results of the control variables seem to be in the accordance with Collier and  
 
Hoeffler (2004), and in some respects, Fearon and Laitin (2003).  The data has shown that the  
 





premise of Collier and Hoeffler‟s economic model.  Similar to Fearon and Laitin, the ethnic and  
 
religious fractionalization variables were not statistically significant and have a positive effect on  
 
civil war onset.  Interestingly, the two variables have a negative association with civil war onset  
 
one year after the intervention occurred.  However, neither variable was statistically significant.  
 
By contrast, the linguistic fractionalization variable is significant and is negatively  
 
associated with civil war onset.    As expected, the political terror variable is statistically  
 
significant and has a positive association with civil war onset, with civil war occurring in the  
 
same year as the intervention and one year after.  
 
 Since WWII, intrastate war has been the dominant form of conflict while becoming more  
 
serious both in intensity and duration than interstate wars.  The increase in intrastate wars is  
 
alarming because it creates not only instability within its relative region, but also creates a haven  
 
for terrorist whom take advantage of the vulnerability of the state. Therefore, understanding the  
 
causes of civil wars is becoming increasingly imperative.   
 
 The IMI data has been incredibly useful for this study in that it has categorized  
 
interventions that have occurred in all regions of the world over the last sixty years.  Using a  
 
particular region in a twenty year period, I was able to regress these different types of  
 
interventions with civil wars that have occurred by the using the COW data set.  The regression  
 
models have shown that international military interventions can have an effect on civil war onset,  
 






This study contributes to the existing literature by suggesting that the term “intervention”  
 
should not be generalized.  Each type of intervention may produce different consequences for the  
 
target country. Knowing the consequences of a particular intervention is important because it  
 
may result in unfavorable consequences that the intervenor had not intended to create. If such  
 
consequences of an intervention are able to be predicted, then leaders are less likely to intervene  
 
for that particular purpose.  Governments should be cautious when intervening particularly for  
 
either humanitarian purposes or for the purpose of pursing a rebel or terrorists group across the  
 
target country‟s border since the data has shown that such interventions increase the likelihood of  
 
civil war onset.  
 
With the increase in both intrastate wars and international military interventions, I invite   
 
scholars to develop this research further to determine whether there is an association between the  
 
two occurrences on a systemic level.  Understanding not only the consequences of international  
 
military intervention, but also the causes of civil war onset could aid governments by preventing  
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End Date Type of 
Intervention 
Description 
Saudi Arabia Yemen 02/29/1980 05/31/1980 Policy 
Economic 
Strategic 
Border & N-S 
merger 

































Destroy reactor  
















forces in Egypt 
Egypt 03/10/1982 12/31/1988 Policy 
Humanitarian 










































































USSR Syria 03/31/1983 12/31/1988 Policy 
Strategic 
SAM Missiles 
Turkey Iraq 05/26/1983 12/31/1987 Domestic 
Strategic 
Kurd rebel 









Morocco Algeria 06/14/1984 06/14/1984 Policy Border incurs 
India Pakistan 06/30/1984 12/31/1987 Policy 
Territory 
Kashmir glacier  




Red Sea mine 
clear 




Red Sea mine 
clear 
United States Saudi 
Arabia 




Red Sea mine 
clear 




Red Sea mine 
clear 
USSR Yemen 08/19/1984 12/31/1984 Policy 
Humanitarian 
Diplomatic 
Red Sea mine 
clear 





















United Nations Afghanistan 05/16/1988 12/31/1988 Policy 
Humanitarian 
Obs. Accords 
United Nations Pakistan 05/16/1988 12/31/1988 Policy 
Humanitarian 
Obs. Accords 


















Scuds and RPGs 
into Pakistan 




fire in Lebanon 
against RJO to 
protect French 
nationals 
United States Lebanon 09/06/1989 09/06/1989 Diplomatic U.S. evacuates 
diplomats from 
Lebanon 
























provisional govt.  
United States Saudi 
Arabia 
08/08/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
U.S. in Saudi 
Arabia to protect 
it from Iraqi 
invasion in Op. 
Desert Shield 




Kuwaiti govt. in 
Desert Storm 
United Kingdom Saudi 
Arabia 





combat, 3 recon 
aircraft, and large 
naval fleet to 
Saudi Arabia for 
Op. Desert Shield 
United Kingdom Kuwait 08/11/1990 04/06/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Territory 
UK troops, air, 























for Op. Desert 
Shield 




part of Persian 










part of Persian 
Gulf Coalition in 
Kuwait 





team & NBC 
experts as part of 
the Persian Gulf 
Coalition 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait 08/12/1990 04/06/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Territory 
Saudi Arabia aids 
in Persian Gulf 
Coalition  




part of Persian 
Gulf in Kuwait 









Kuwait 08/12/1990 04/06/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Territory 



















aircraft & 3 ships 
to Saudi Arabia 









Saudi Arabia for 











aircraft & 2 frig 
& 1 supply ship 








& 4 ships for 
Saudi Arabia in 















08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
France provides 
troops & Legion, 
32 combat 
aircraft, and large 
carrier groups to 
Saudi Arabia for 
Op. Desert Shield 








Portugal  Saudi 
Arabia 
08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Portugal provides 
supply ship for 
Op. Desert Shield 
Czechoslovakia Saudi 
Arabia 





unit & hospital 
unit to Saudi 




08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Italy provides 8 
combat aircraft, 2 
frig, 1 supply 
ship to Saudi 








08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Greece provides 
1 frigate to Saudi 










ship, 2 supply 




08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Diplomatic Sweden 
evacuates foreign 
national from 
Saudi Arabia  
Denmark Saudi 
Arabia 




warship to Saudi 




08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Senegal provides 
500 troops for 
Op. Desert Shield 
Niger Saudi 
Arabia 
08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Niger provides 
infantry troops in 
Op. Desert Shield 
Syria Saudi 
Arabia 
08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Syria in Saudi 
Arabia to protect 
it from Iraqi 









the Gulf Council 








08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic  
Bahrain provides 





08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Qatar provides 
troops as a Gulf 
council member 






08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
UAE in Saudi 
Arabia to protect 
it from Iraqi 








gulf council in 
Op. Desert Shield 
Pakistan Saudi 
Arabia 
08/13/1990 01/15/1991 Strategic  Pakistan 
intervenes in 
Saudi Arabia to 
protect Mecca 









for Saudi Arabia 








frigates and 1 
supply ship to 
Saudi Arabia for 













hospital team and 
one medical 
transport aircraft 
for Op. Desert 
Shield 




part of Persian 
Gulf Coalition in 
Kuwait 












troops for Persian 
Gulf Coalition in 
Kuwait 
Czechoslovakia Kuwait 09/25/1991 04/06/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Territory 
Czech troops part 
of Persian Gulf 
Coalition in 
Kuwait 
Syria Kuwait 11/04/1991 04/06/1991 Economic 
Strategic 
Territory 








troops as part of 
Persian Gulf 
Coalition  





team and troops 






Iraq Israel 01/18/1991 02/28/1991 Strategic Iraqi scud attack 
against Israel 






as part of 
coalition in 
Kuwait 




aid Persian Gulf 
Coalition in 
Kuwait 




troops into Iraq 
from Saudi 
Arabia 




into Iraq from 
Saudi Arabia 




troops into Iraq 
from Saudi 
Arabia 
United Nations Iraq 04/03/1991 09/30/2003 Policy 
Economic 
Strategy 
UN in Iraq for 
peacekeeping on 
Kuwaiti border 
United Nations Kuwait 04/03/1991 09/30/2003 Economic 
Strategic 
Humanitarian 











in N. Iraq for 
Kurd 
humanitarian aid 
Germany Iran 04/24/1991 --- Social 
Humanitarian 
Germany sets up 
relief base in Iran 





USSR Afghanistan 07/31/1991 12/31/1995 Pursuit Russia attacks 
rebel bases in 
Afghanistan 
Turkey Iraq 08/05/1991 07/06/2003 Pursuit Turkish ground 
and air attacks on 
Kurds in Iraq, 
intermittent but 
within 6 months 
of each other 
Iran Iraq 04/05/1992 04/05/1992 Pursuit Iranian planes 
bomb suspected 




04/10/1992 --- Strategic 
Territory 
 
















in S. Iraq 








Iran Iraq 03/14/1993 08/08/1993 Pursuit Iranian forces 
attack Kurdish 
rebel basis in Iraq 






United States Kuwait 01/08/1994 12/24/1994 Strategic U.S. build up in 
Kuwait to 
respond to Iraqi 
border build-up 
United Kingdom Kuwait 01/10/1994 12/24/1994 Economic 
Strategic 




France Kuwait 01/11/1994 01/31/1994 Economic 
Strategic 
French send 
frigate to aid 
force in 
defending Kuwait 
Oman Kuwait 01/11/1994 12/24/1994 Economic 
Strategic 
Oman sends 
naval forces to 
defend Kuwait 
Bahrain Kuwait 01/12/1994 12/24/1994 Economic 
Strategic 
Bahrain sends 
naval and air 




Kuwait 01/12/1994 12/24/1994 Economic 
Strategic 
UAE sends 
troops and 6 
mirages to defend 
Kuwait 
Iran  Iraq 11/07/1994 11/09/1994 Pursuit Iran attacks rebel 









Iran Iraq 07/27/1996 07/31/1996 Pursuit Iran carries out 
raids against 
Kurdish rebels in 
Iraq 
United States Kuwait 09/18/1996 12/15/1996 Economic 
Strategic 
US buildup of 











Watch to defend 
no-fly zone in 
Northern Iraq and 
provide 
humanitarian aid 
to Kurds in N. 
Iraq 
Iran Iraq 09/29/1997 09/29/1997 Pursuit Iran carries out 
air raids against 
opposition group 
in Iraq 




United States Afghanistan 08/20/1998 08/20/1998 Policy 
Strategy  
U.S. uses cruise 
missiles to attack 
suspected 
terrorist facilities  
Pakistan  Afghanistan  09/16/1998 09/18/1998 Strategy Pakistan air raids 
intended to aid 
Taliban 
government 
Turkey Iran 07/19/1999 07/19/1999 Pursuit Turkish air raids 
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